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The	assessment	of	the	balance	of	risks	to	the	stability	of	the	Spanish	financial	
system	has	worsened	somewhat	in	the	past	six	months	owing,	in	particular,	
to	the	downward	revision	of	the	global	economic	outlook.	Since the publication 
of the last Financial Stability Report (FSR), growth projections have been scaled 
down in most economies. Indeed, the increase in global GDP this year is expected 
to be the lowest since the international financial crisis. Moreover, the balance 
of risks to this growth is tilted to the downside. This flatter economic activity 
may have implications both for financial and real asset valuations and for 
agents’ decisions. 
Against this background, the main factors of risk to the stability of the Spanish 
financial system are the following (Table 1):
1	 	Global	 economic	 slowdown	 and	 geopolitical	 uncertainty.	
One of the factors of risk identified in the previous FSR, relating 
to the slowdown in global economic activity, has already begun to 
materialise. A good number of the high-frequency conjunctural 
indicators are showing signs of substantial weakness, foretelling 
the entry into technical recession of some large economies and 
giving rise to a downward revision of growth forecasts. 
MAIN RISKS TO THE STABILITY OF THE SPANISH FINANCIAL SYSTEM
RISK FACTORS (a)
Table 1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The risks which appear in this table are calibrated using three colours: yellow indicates low risk, orange, medium risk, and red, high risk. Consequently, 
at present the three risks are at a medium level. The time horizon for which these risks are defined is set by the FSR's frequency, i.e. half-yearly. For 
each risk level, the arrows indicate whether risk has recently increased, held stable or diminished. Reclassification compared with a previous FSR of 
a risk factor to a different level (change of colour) involves posting a stable-trending arrow.
1 Global economic slowdown and geopolitical uncertainty. The economic slowdown 
is affecting Europe and the emerging economies more sharply and, along with high geopolitical 
uncertainty, might entail an increase in risk premia that reduces the value of financial assets. 
Moreover, it might also weigh down agents’ income and raise their projected debt levels, 
thereby leading to revised consumption and investment plans.
2 Low profitability of financial institutions. Financial institutions’ profitability will be under 
additional pressure owing to the economic slowdown and, therefore, to the prospect that interest 
rates may hold at very low and even negative levels for longer than expected.
3 Legal risk. Spanish deposit institutions face, with varying degrees of intensity, a legal risk arising 
from the potential consequences of the outcomes of legal demands against them.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 12 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, AUTUMN 2019  MAIN RISKS TO THE STABILITY OF THE SPANISH FINANCIAL SYSTEM
The revision of economic activity forecasts is across the board, 
but it has particularly impacted Europe, where Germany’s export 
sector is showing notable weakness, and the emerging economies 
(Chart 1). Spain has also been affected by these downward 
revisions to the growth outlook (Chart 2). 
Global geopolitical uncertainty remains high and is also starting to 
weigh on agents’ decisions, especially those requiring a longer 
timeframe for realisation, such as investment. 
The causes of this geopolitical uncertainty remain largely in place, 
and those that have disappeared have been replaced by other, 
fresh sources. Firstly, the US-China trade tensions continue, 
SOURCES: Thomson Reuters Datastream, Consensus, INE and Banco de España.
a Average of 3-month volatilities for USD/EUR, USD/GBP and JPY/USD.
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a major cause of which is leadership in technological sectors. 
Further, the maximum tariffs that can be applied to certain products 
are being revised, potentially affecting US-European trade relations. 
Secondly, the risk of a no-deal Brexit still persits, despite the 
additional prorogue approved by the European Council. Tensions 
in the Middle East also seem to be intensifying. Conversely, the 
forming of a new government in Italy in September should 
contribute to stabilising the country’s fiscal situation. Finally, in 
Spain, a new government could not be formed following the last 
elections; accordingly, fresh elections have been called for 10 
November, prolonging the uncertainty over economic policy 
formulation. Further compounding this has been the impact of the 
latest developments in Catalonia.
To date, the international financial markets’ reaction to the rise in 
global uncertainty has been contained, and has not taken the form 
of higher risk premia and lower asset prices (Charts 3 and 4). This 
has, partly, been the result of the resolute action by many central 
banks, which eased monetary conditions even further in the face 
of the scant convergence of inflation towards its objective and/or 
the implications of global developments for the growth outlook. 
In the euro area, monetary accommodation has been accompanied 
by additional measures to smooth bank funding (new more 
favourable conditions in the new series of quarterly refinancing 
operations, namely TLTRO III) and to mitigate the impact on 
profitability (a two-tier system for the remuneration of the reserves 
banks hold at the central bank). 
In this respect, the economic slowdown and the potential 
materialisation of geopolitical risks might have adverse effects on 
financial stability through various channels. First, agents might 
be led to reassess their perception of risk, prompting a rise in the 
associated premia that could cause an acute and lasting adjustment 
in the prices of the financial assets affected, giving rise to losses in 
all agents’ portfolios, including deposit institutions. Second, 
households’ and non-financial corporations’ income flows would 
decline, through lower employment creation and an easing in wage 
earnings (households) and a reduction in profits (companies). This 
means that the debt levels of both groups of agents might ultimately 
be higher than expected, with a further negative impact on future 
consumption and investment. Through this channel, which will 
gain in significance if the adverse situation persists over time, 
financial intermediaries’ activity would also be affected, essentially 
the quality of their assets and the demand for financial services, 
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including credit. As a result, deposit institutions would encounter 
greater difficulties in further strengthening their balance sheets 
and, potentially, their solvency might worsen. 
2	 	Low	profitability	of	financial	institutions. In the first half of 2019 
Spanish deposit institutions saw their consolidated net income fall 
by around 11% compared with the same period a year earlier. A 
more detailed analysis shows that much of the decline is due to 
the lower gains on financial assets and to the increase in 
extraordinary operating expenses, meaning that recurrent 
operating income did not decline so much. Moreover, net interest 
income increased slightly (Chart 5). Indeed, the level of profitability 
observed in June 2019 is one of the highest of the post-crisis 
period, above the European average, although it has still not 
exceeded the cost of equity (COE).
Looking ahead, the downward revision of the growth and inflation 
outlook and, as a result, the stronger prospect that interest rates 
will hold for longer at very low or even negative levels, will pose a 
notable challenge for the recovery of profitability levels in step with 
the COE. In fact, the markets have in recent months lowered their 
expectations about banks’ profit growth. 
Lower profitability hampers the organic generation of capital. 
However, institutions have slightly raised their top-quality 
capital ratios in the recent period, reversing the downward trend 
of the past two years. Moreover, the stress tests conducted by the 
Banco de España suggest that their resilience in the face of 
the risks identified materialising has increased and is appropriate 
at the aggregate level. In any event, while largely exceeding 
regulatory requirements, the relatively low ranking of Spanish 
institutions Europe-wide and the future roll-out of the last part of 
the Basel III reforms advise further perseverance in their shoring 
up of solvency. 
On the favourable side, the lower cost of financing that the context 
of very low interest rates entails will contribute to facilitating 
deposit institutions’ issuance of eligible liabilities to comply with 
the MREL (minimum requirement for own funds and eligible 
liabilities), which is designed to avoid the use of public funds in the 
resolution of non-viable institutions. 
The risks around profitability do not only affect the income 
statements of deposit institutions but also those of other financial 
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institutions, such as investment and pension funds and insurance 
companies, which have gained in importance in the financial sector 
post-crisis (Chart 6). This is especially so when these institutions 
guarantee a specific profitability for their customers and also if their 
operational funding requirements are not sufficiently covered. 
Against this background, financial intermediaries may have 
incentives to offset the low profitability of their normal business 
with greater risk-taking; accordingly, greater watchfulness will be 
required to prevent the build-up of systemic risks. 
3  Legal risk. As noted in the previous FSR, the cost for Spanish 
deposit institutions of legal processes relating to certain mortgage 
agreement clauses has been high. And, at the same time, other 
significant legal processes are still to be resolved. In particular, 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is expected 
in the coming months to unveil its response to the pre-trial 
questions raised in relation to the use of the mortgage loan 
benchmark index (IRPH by its Spanish abbreviation). 
In this setting, banks should continue to strive to provide their 
customers with financial products suited to their needs and 
capacities, and to furnish the relevant information on their products 
and services clearly and transparently. The recent regulatory 
changes in the mortgage market might help further this objective. 
It should be borne in mind that reputation and customer confidence 
are essential factors for developing banking business. 
SOURCES: Banco de España, Inverco and CNMV.
a The red (green) colour of the bars indicates a negative (positive) contribution by the related item to the change in the consolidated result for June 
2019 compared with June 2018.
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This	 FSR	 includes	 additional	 elements	 of	 analysis	 related	 to	 the	 risks	 to	
financial	stability.	 In particular, it analyses potential factors of vulnerability, such 
as the level of debt and the financial position of the non-financial private sector and 
of the public sector. It further looks at developments in the real estate market, 
solvency and liquidity stress tests for the banking sector and systemic risk indicators. 
Lastly, it describes the macroprudential policy stance, which is the main tool for 
mitigating the potential impact of the risks identified.   
Non-financial	 private	 sector	 debt	 ratios	 have	 continued	 to	 decline,	 standing	
below	average	euro	area	levels. Indeed, the non-financial private sector debt ratio 
relative to GDP stood at 132%, 5 pp down on a year earlier and 4 pp below the euro area 
average. This deleveraging process has been generalised across both households 
and firms, although in both sectors there continue to be vulnerable groups with high 
levels of debt. In this respect, consumer credit grew in June 2019 at a year-on-year 
rate of around 12%, and non-performing consumer loans at 26%, raising the 
NPL ratio slightly to 5.6% (Chart 7). 
In the real estate sector, lending standards for household loans broadly continue to 
be prudent and the indicators of activity appear to be showing signs of slowing. 
However, prices continue to grow at a high pace (Chart 8), meaning its future course 
will require continued monitoring. 
Public sector debt is holding at a high level and the Spanish economy’s net 
international investment position remains significantly negative. That is a source of 
vulnerability ahead of any future changes in sentiment on international financial 
markets or of a downturn in the macroeconomic situation. 
The	stress	tests	conducted	by	the	Banco	de	España	this	year	on	the	banking	
sector	 show	 adequate	 resilience	 at	 the	 aggregate	 level.	 The adverse 
SOURCES: Banco de España and INE.
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macroeconomic scenario used on this occasion for the stress tests involves a 
slight increase in severity relative to the test the previous year. Notwithstanding, the 
reduction in banks’ capital (Chart 9) is somewhat less than in 2018. This 
is essentially due to the fact that the institutions’ opening balance sheets are in a 
better position, with lower NPL ratios and a lower volume of foreclosed assets. In 
the adverse scenario the exercise also shows limited capacity on the part of the 
banks to generate operating income and significant deleveraging. On this occasion 
there was an additional sensitivity test under the adverse scenario, subjecting the 
sovereign exposures at amortised cost (i.e. not subject to changes in valuation 
based on market price developments) to the same stress as the sovereign exposures 
at fair value (Chart 10). Capital consumption in this case increases substantially, 
revealing the significance of the risk associated with the decline in the valuation 
of certain assets.     
The	 Banco	 de	 España	 has	 kept	 its	 macroprudential	 policy	 stance	 towards	
systemic	risks	unchanged.	The analysis set out in the FSR endorses holding the 
Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCyB) at 0%. However, under the baseline projection 
scenario several benchmark indicators would exceed the activation thresholds in 
the first half of 2021. Were this macroprudential instrument activated, the credit 
institutions affected would have 12 months in which to comply with the requirement. 
Nonetheless, this diagnosis is conditional on there being no deviations from the 
baseline projections scenario. At present there are numerous factors of downside 
risk (possibility of a no-deal Brexit, the stepping up of trade tensions and a delay in 
the resumption of economic growth in the euro area). Their potential materialisation 
would involve a change in this assessment.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The percentage of the sovereign exposure classified in portfolios under the amortised cost criterion (i.e. which is not classified under the fair value 
criterion) is, for December 2018, presented for each group of institutions, as is the sovereign exposure/total assets ratio. For the 2019-2021 horizon, 
the chart depicts the additional consumption expressed in pp of the CET1 ratio that would arise under the adverse scenario were the sovereign 
exposure under the amortised cost criterion to be reclassified under the fair value criterion.
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The global economy continued to decelerate in 2019 against a background of high 
geopolitical uncertainty (trade disputes, possibility of a no-deal Brexit, tension in the 
Middle East, etc.), with Europe and the emerging economies the most affected. 
This has led to a downward revision of the growth outlook, and the Spanish economy 
has been no exception to this pattern. The slowdown in activity and the absence of 
inflationary pressures have led to an easing of monetary policy in the United States 
and in the euro area. There has been some upturn in volatility on the financial markets, 
but asset prices have held at historically high levels, especially following the monetary 
policy reaction. Activity in the Spanish real estate market has slowed to some extent 
in 2019 while mortgage lending conditions have tightened slightly. There has also 
been a deceleration in the flow of financing to the non-financial sector, whose net asset 
position continued to improve, albeit at a slower pace and with certain household and 
corporate sectors in a more fragile position. 
1.1  Macroeconomic environment 
1.1.1  Key systemic countries 
The	 contraction	 in	 global	 trade	 deepened	 against	 the	 backdrop	 of	 growing	 
trade	 tensions,	 which	 are	 one	 of	 the	 main	 risks	 to	 the	 world	 economy.	 
Global trade in goods contracted in Q2 more sharply than in Q1, declining at a quarterly 
rate of 0.8% and weighed down by the worsening of the trade disputes between the 
United States and China (Chart 1.1). The US imposition of additional tariffs on European 
products is also raising trade tensions. Uncertainty over the course of the conflict 
remains very high, but should the measures announced become effective, the impact 
on global growth could be substantial. Other geopolitical risks have played a greater 
role in recent months, in particular the likelihood of a disorderly withdrawal by the 
United Kingdom from the European Union (Box 1.1). Tensions in the Middle East also 
intensified, prompting a notable but temporary rise in oil prices in September. 
In	this	setting	the	global	economy	continued	to	move	on	a	slowing	path,	 in	a	
highly	uncertain	setting. Global GDP growth eased further in 2019 Q2 to a year-on-
year rate of 2.8%, more than 1 pp down on a year earlier (Chart 1.1). The downturn was 
particularly manifest in manufacturing and in the wholesale and retail trade, while the 
remaining services initially trended more favourably. By type of expenditure, investment 
weakened compared with the greater resilience of consumption. The US economy 
remained somewhat more robust than other advanced economies, although it too 
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BANCO DE ESPAÑA 22 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, AUTUMN 2019  1 RISKS LINKED TO THE MACROFINANCIAL ENVIRONMENT
slowed. Among the emerging economies, economic activity in China decelerated 
once more in Q2. All in all this has given rise to across-the-board downward revisions 
of growth forecasts for 2019. 
In	 the	 emerging	 markets	 with	 a	 significant	 Spanish	 banking	 presence,	
considerable	 risks	 associated	 with	 the	 global	 uncertainty	 and	 with	 various	
idiosyncratic	events	persist.	In Mexico, the economic outlook has worsened, which 
will result in fresh challenges in the fiscal realm. These compound the delicate situation 
of the State-held company Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), which has recently received 
a $5 billion capital injection from the government and has lengthened debt maturities 
The slowdown in the world economy has continued. Analysts have duly revised their growth forecasts for 2019 downwards for the main economies, 
in a setting characterised by the US-China trade tensions, which have shrunk global trade and may have significant effects on global activity.
GLOBAL TRADE AND OUTPUT GROWTH
Chart 1.1
SOURCES: National statistics, Consensus, CPB, Thomson Reuters and Banco de España.
a The simulation considers two scenarios: that affecting EU-China bilateral relations and the subsequent reduction in global demand; and another in 
which, moreover, a decline in confidence and an increase in uncertainty come about.
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by repaying short-term bonds and issuing long-term debt securities. The current risks 
the economy is facing in Brazil might be relieved somewhat by the pension system 
reform (a key element for ensuring the sustainability of public finances). Congress 
approved the reform and the Senate is shortly expected to follow suit. Finally, in Turkey, 
whose economy has experienced a recession, uncertainty also remains high. This is 
even after the recent GDP and inflation figures, which were better than expected.
The	other	 emerging	 financial	markets	 have	 also	 been	 affected. Although its 
relative weight is small, Argentina is the most notable case. The primary election results 
in August had a strong adverse impact on financial markets and increased doubts over 
the sustainability of public debt (Chart 1.2). Set against the heavy depreciation of the 
peso, the central bank decided to considerably tighten its monetary policy stance. 
The government, meantime, announced its intention to reschedule debt payments, 
obligatorily lengthening the maturity of Treasury bills held by institutional investors and, 
voluntarily, that of longer-dated debt held both by residents and non-residents. 
The government likewise requested a change in the debt payment schedule arranged 
with the International Monetary Fund. This process culminated in early September 
in the introduction of capital controls and limits on dollar purchases by residents, 
which have tightened following the elections last Sunday, on 27 October. So far, the 
financial markets have not reacted significantly to the results of these elections.
In	 the	 euro	 area,	 the	 increase	 in	 economic	 activity	was	 very	moderate	 in	Q2.	 
The	indicators	available	suggest	this	pattern	has	extended	into	Q3.	GDP slowed 
in 2019 Q2 owing largely to the fall-off in exports and the slackness of investment (Chart 
1.3). Growth was particularly modest in economies where the industrial sector has a 
greater weight, such as Germany and also Italy. The indicators available for Q3 suggest a 
Emerging countries’ financial instruments lost value during the summer as a result of the trade war and of the elections in Argentina, but they 
have recently stabilised, but for Argentina itself.
EMERGING ECONOMIES
Chart 1.2
SOURCES: JP Morgan and Thomson Reuters.
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Euro area GDP growth slowed notably in Q2 owing largely to the fall-off in exports. Economic activity was particularly sluggish in the 
economies with a greater industrial specialisation, particularly Germany and Italy.
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE EURO AREA
Chart 1.3
SOURCE: Eurostat.
a Excluding Ireland.
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further downturn in manufacturing activities and a more moderate services performance. 
In this setting, the Eurosystem’s September forecast revised GDP growth downwards 
to 1.1% and to 1.2% for 2019 and 2020, respectively, compared with the June projection. 
The	downturn	 in	 the	global	growth	outlook	and	the	absence	of	 inflationary	
pressures	have	led	to	a	fresh	easing	in	monetary	policies	in	the	main	advanced	
economies. The US Federal Reserve cut its policy interest rate in July, September 
and October to a range between 1.5% and 1.75%, as a preventive measure against 
global risks. The ECB, at its September Governing Council meeting, agreed to 
introduce a package of measures with a clear accommodative stance. Among 
others, it approved a 10 bp cut in the deposit facility interest rate, placing it 
at –0.50%, reinforced its forward guidance on interest rates, and improved the 
lending conditions governing quarterly TLTRO. The ECB also agreed to resume 
net purchases under its asset purchase programme, at a monthly rate of €20 billion 
as from 1 November and with no defined time limit (Box 1.2). Moreover, a large 
number of central banks in other advanced and emerging economies cut their 
policy interest rates. 
1.1.2 Spain
On	the	Banco	de	España’s	projections,	GDP	in	2019	Q3	grew	at	0.4%,	a	similar	
pace	to	that	of	Q2	(Chart 1.4). The growth rates of the various demand components 
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moderated in 2019 H1. In particular, the loss of momentum in the global environment 
and the rise in uncertainty impacted in the first half of the year the different domestic 
demand components. Indicators available for 2019 Q3 suggest a more dynamic behavior 
of household expenditures and firms in that quarter. The slowdown in activity has 
been apparent in employment, where the moderation has been somewhat sharper 
than that in output, according to the Social Security registration figures and the 
last Spanish Labour Force Survey (EPA). That points to a loss of dynamism 
in private-sector employment which, while across the board, may be more acute 
in construction.
The	 medium-term	 baseline	 scenario	 envisages	 a	 continuation	 of	 the	
expansionary	phase,	albeit	at	a	more	moderate	rate	and	with	downside	risks.	
The latest Banco de España macroeconomic projections, published in September, 
point to a continuation of the expansion over the 2019-2021 period (Chart 1.4).1 Under 
this baseline scenario, however, the pace of GDP growth would be somewhat 
less than that of previous years, in step with the persistence of the uncertainty 
linked mainly to the external setting. Further, this baseline path will be subject to 
downside risks, associated with a potential worsening of trade tensions and with the 
materialisation of specific geopolitical risks (such as a no-deal Brexit). That would 
1  For further details, see Box 1 “Macroeconomic projections for Spain (2019-2021)”, Quarterly report on 
the Spanish economy, Economic Bulletin 3/2019, Banco de España.
The expansion is projected to continue during the 2019-2021 period, albeit with lower growth rates than in previous years and with downside 
risks. In the recent period GDP is estimated to have once again been underpinned by domestic demand growth, though this latter variable 
would have been affected by the build-up of external and domestic uncertainties.
SPANISH GDP
Chart 1.4
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
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give rise to lower-than-expected growth in the Spanish economy. On the domestic 
side, it cannot be ruled out that the persistence of uncertainty over the future course 
of economic policies and the recent events in Catalonia may affect output developments. 
1.2  Financial markets and real estate sector 
1.2.1 Financial markets 
Geopolitical	risks,	trade	tensions,	the	global	macroeconomic	outlook	and	central	
banks’	accommodative	monetary	policies	have	all	influenced	developments	on	
international	financial	markets.	In two specific episodes, in May and in August, 
negative sentiment on the markets prevailed regarding the outcome of trade 
negotiations between China and the United States, other geopolitical risks and, in 
general, the outlook for economic activity. This was reflected in across-the-board 
declines in higher-risk asset prices, such as equities and high-yield corporate bonds, 
and increases in those considered safer, such as sovereign debt (Chart 1.5). Additional 
downward pressure on the long-term yields on these securities was exerted by the 
expectations of more accommodative monetary policies, leading to historical lows in 
most euro area countries and in the United States. The growing uncertainty on 
markets also entailed a rise in price volatility, markedly so in the case of sovereign debt. 
Since	 late	August,	 sentiment	 on	 the	 financial	markets	 has	 improved	 across	 
the	 board,	 against	 a	 background	 of	 apparent	 progress	 in	 US-China	 trade	
negotiations. This has translated into a rise in sovereign debt yields and a recovery 
in higher-risk asset prices. As a result, the main stock market indices in the developed 
countries are, at the cut-off date for this FSR, above the levels reached at the 
related cut-off date for the previous FSR and, in the case of the United States, very 
close to their historical high. Their cyclically adjusted PER, which is an indicator of the 
degree of alignment between stock market prices and economic fundamentals, 
evidences somewhat high levels compared with corporate profits, given the historical 
relationship between the two variables (Chart 1.6). By contrast, on Spanish and euro 
area markets, this ratio has been below its average level since 1997, which suggests 
the absence of signs of overvaluation.
Of	note	on	euro	area	 financial	markets	 is	 the	compression	of	 sovereign	 risk	
premia	since	June	2019,	along	with	the	worse	performance	of	bank	stock	market	
indices in relative terms. In Spain, the 10-year sovereign debt yield spread over the 
German benchmark has fallen by around 45 bp, while in Italy it has declined by 
around 120 bp (Chart 1.6). Behind these developments have been both the announced 
resumption of the ECB’s asset purchase programmes and a lower perception of risk. 
In Italy, a key factor has been the formation of a new, more European-oriented 
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government, while in Spain both the improved credit rating granted by Standard & 
Poor’s (from “A” to “A+”) in late September and the DBRS upgrade of the outlook 
(from stable to positive) have been pivotal. The European bank stock market indices 
have posted further declines, since the publication of the previous FSR, of 7% in 
the case of the EuroStoxx Banks sub-index and 10% in that of the Madrid Stock 
Exchange listed banks (Chart 1.6). These declines in bank prices are due to the 
worsening in the macroeconomic outlook, which bears down on expected profits in 
the banking sector both through the effect on the diminished quality of their credit 
portfolios and the lesser demand for banking services, and through the possible 
Following certain episodes in which negative sentiment prevailed on the markets, higher-risk asset prices have picked up somewhat since 
end-August. Long-term sovereign debt yields also recovered, after having posted historical lows in most euro area countries and in the 
United States in August. The slope of the US yield curve inverted in August in the 2-10-year tranche for the first time since 2007. Excepting 
a brief episode in early October, market volatility has tended to decline since late August.
FINANCIAL MARKET INDICATORS
Chart 1.5
SOURCES: Thomson Reuters Datastream.
a Average of 3-month volatiities for USD/EUR, USD/GBP and JPY/USD.
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narrowing of the unit net interest margin associated with expectations that interest 
rates will hold at very low or even negative levels for a longer period. 
Spanish	stock	market	 indices	have	performed	more	poorly	 than	the	related	
indicators on the main European markets. This is due mainly to the greater 
decline in banking sector share prices in Spain and to the relatively greater weight of 
this sector in national indices. 
The	materialisation	of	some	of	the	risks	described	in	Section	1.1	might	lead	to	
fresh	periods	of	 tension	on	 international	 financial	markets,	with	 potentially	
The price-earnings ratio (PER), in cyclically adjusted terms, stands somewhat above its historical average in the United States, and below 
this average in the euro area and in Spain. Of note in the euro area financial markets is the compression in sovereign risk premia and the 
poorer relative performance of the banking stock market indices. The financial conditions indices show that such conditions continue to be 
relatively easy in the advanced economies.
OTHER FINANCIAL MARKET INDICATORS
Chart 1.6
SOURCES: Robert J. Shiller, Thomson Reuters Datastream and Bloomberg Data License.
a The cyclically adjusted PER is calculated as the ratio of share prices to the ten-year moving average of profits.
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adverse	 consequences	 for	 financial	 stability. A new episode of this type, 
accompanied by strong rises in risk premia, would entail a tightening of financial 
conditions that would interrupt a long period over which these conditions had 
remained loose (Chart 1.6). These developments might affect to a greater extent the 
more vulnerable segments such as that of debt with impaired credit quality, including 
leveraged loans and CLOs,2 and markets with high valuations, and they could spread 
to other assets. That would amplify the direct effect of the economic growth shock 
associated with agents’ lower confidence and other real factors, impairing not only 
the credit quality of banks’ portfolios but also reducing the value of other securities 
on their balance sheets. 
In	 the	 medium	 term,	 the	 extension	 over	 time	 of	 easy	 financial	 conditions	
characterised	 by	 very	 low	 interest	 rates	 also	 poses	 some	 challenges	 for	
financial	 stability.	 Against this background, macro- and microprudential 
supervisors should monitor closely the behaviour of bank and non-bank 
intermediaries and use the instruments available to curb any excessive risk-taking 
with systemic implications or to build up buffers with which to counter future 
adverse shocks. 
1.2.2 The real estate market in Spain
The	 information	 available	 points	 to	 a	 slowdown	 in	 activity	 in	 the	 real	 estate	 
market	 in	 2019	up	 to	 the	 cut-off	 date	of	 this	 report.	Since late 2018, a growing 
number of housing market indicators, on both the supply and demand sides, have 
slowed. This has been in spite of easy borrowing conditions holding and of continuing 
employment creation, albeit at lower rates. The uncertainty stemming from the external 
environment might have begun to feed through, as in the case of other domestic demand 
components, to residential investment. As regards sale/purchase transactions, the 
slowdown has been sharper in the second-hand housing market (Chart 1.7). This recent 
loss of momentum in housing transactions will be largely attributable to the slowdown 
in the national component of housing demand, since the non-national component 
(resident and non-resident alike) is holding stable around late-2018 levels, which marked 
a peak. The construction of new housing, proxied by the number of building permits, 
decelerated notably in year-on-year terms until July. In cumulative 12-month terms, 
the figure for building permits in July accounted for just over 12% of the pre-crisis peak.
Second-hand	 house	 prices	 have	 recently	 slowed,	 while	 the	 growth	 rate	 of	 
new	house	prices	has	risen.	 In the first half of 2019, average house prices posted 
year-on-year growth of 6%, compared with 6.7% in 2018 as a whole. The slowdown 
2  CLOs are leveraged loan securitisations. See “Financial Stability Report”, Federal Reserve Board, May 
2019, and Banco de España FSR, Spring 2019.	The	presence	of	CLOs	in	the	Spanish	financial	system	is	
very low compared with other European countries and the United States.
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was due to the developments in the second-hand housing market, which increased 
by 5.6%, 1.2 pp lower than in 2018. Conversely, the prices of new houses continued 
to accelerate in the first half of the year (8.8% year-on-year, above the 2018 figure 
of 6.4%). As a result, they have continued to draw closer to their 2008 Q3 peak level, 
standing 7 pp below. Although, in real terms they are still 18% below their historical 
high.3 In aggregate and real terms, house prices are still around 30% below their 
2007 Q3 high (Chart 1.7). The indicators and models available, based on aggregate 
data and subject to a high degree of uncertainty, would suggest that prices are 
already around their equilibrium level (Chart 1.7). 
Real	estate	market	activity	and	prices	continue	to	show	high	heterogeneity	
across regions and segments. In the past 12 months, the increase in prices for 
new and second-hand housing alike has tended to ease in those areas where prices 
had grown to a greater extent from their post-crisis low. Conversely, the rate of 
increase of prices has held up and, in some cases, steepened in those areas where 
prices had recovered more slowly. In terms of the volume of housing transactions, 
the slowdown has been generalised across the regions; that said, those that have 
been most dynamic since the recovery have shown greater weakness over the past 
year in relative terms (Chart 1.7). That is to say, some convergence and rebalancing 
in the rates of change of prices and volume of transactions is under way.
The	 percentage	 of	 households	 paying	 rentals	 continued	 growing	 in	 2018,	
although	 there	 continues	 to	 be	 notable	 heterogeneity	 between	 types	 of	
households and geographical areas. In 2018, the weight of residential rentals in 
Spain held on the growing trend dating back to the mid-2000s, especially among 
those households in which the age of the reference person is between 30 and 44 
years. The weight of rentals in 2018 grew across the board in Spain’s regions, albeit 
maintaining notable disparity.
In	 line	 with	 the	 slowdown	 in	 real	 estate	 market	 activity,	 new	 lending	 to	
households	for	house	purchase	has	lost	momentum.	Since June, the volume of 
new lending under this heading has been contracting in year-on-year terms. This 
had not occurred since early 2014 (Chart 1.8). In this respect, the Bank Lending 
Survey (BLS) suggested that during the first half of the year there had been some 
tightening in lending standards, while loan applications had remained rather flat. 
The developments in new lending have meant that the rate of contraction of the 
outstanding balance of credit in this segment has ceased to ease in recent months 
(–1.1% in August), breaking the trend recorded in 2018. 
The	interest	rates	on	new	loans	for	house	purchase	fell	by	around	20	bp,	in	
cumulative	terms,	from	May	to	August	(Chart 1.8). This decline is mainly linked 
3  In the same period, second-hand house prices stood 38% below their respective high. 
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Real estate activity has slowed in the course of 2019, influenced by the slowdown in demand by national purchasers but also by agents' 
adaptation to the latest regulatory changes in the mortgage market. Housing supply has also slowed and continues to be far off its precrisis 
peak volume. Second-hand house prices have recently decelerated, while new house prices are drawing closer to their historical high.
HOUSING MARKET ACTIVITY INDICATORS (a)
Chart 1.7
SOURCES: Banco de España, ECB, Eurostat and INE.
a Latest observation: 2019 Q2 (house prices) and August (house purchases). Real house prices are deflated using the consumer price index.
b The maximum and minimum of four imbalance indicators are shown. The first two are gaps calculated as the difference between the value of the 
variable of interest in each period and its long-term trend for: (i) house prices in real terms and (ii) the house prices/household disposable income 
ratio. The last two indicators are based on econometric models. The first of these is based on an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation of house 
prices, in real terms, in respect of household disposable income and mortgage interest rates. The second is based on an Error Correction Model 
(ECM) in which, in the long term, real-terms house prices depend on household disposable income and mortgage interest rates. In all cases, 
longterm trends are obtained using a one-tailed Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter equal to 400,000.
c Year-on-year rate of change taking the cumulative 12-month flow.
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to the fall in wholesale funding costs since April. Thus, for example, the 12-month 
EURIBOR, the usual benchmark rate for these transactions, fell by 17 bp from 
April to July.
The loan-to-value (LTV) and loan-to-price (LTP) ratios also suggest some 
tightening in mortgage lending standards. Chart 1.9 displays the distribution 
of these two indicators for new mortgages, obtained from the databases of the 
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Spanish Association of Registrars. In both cases, the amount lent is related to 
the collateral value of the mortgage, whereby an increase (reduction) in the proportion 
of loans with a high LTV/LTP would denote an easing (tightening) of lending standards. 
In this respect, the weight of more leveraged loans (those with an LTV or an LTP of 
over 80%), is lower in new mortgage financing. Moreover, the average LTV on new 
lending stabilised in the first half of 2019, while the average LTP diminished again. The 
average amount of mortgages fell in regions with a higher income level and grew less 
sharply in the other geographical regions. This suggests that the loan-income ratio of 
individuals or households with mortgages, another relevant factor for assessing 
mortgage conditions, might also have improved. 
The	LTV	and	LTP	figures	are	highly	stable.	Despite the fact that the weight of 
transactions with a low LTV has fallen significantly in recent years, the average LTV 
is only slightly higher at present. By contrast, in the case of the LTP, there has been 
a reduction in the weight of the most leveraged transactions (with an LTP of over 
80%) compared with the crisis years. Moreover, the average LTP is also lower. Box 
1.3 analyses in detail the consequences of these new lending standards for the risk 
institutions take on in the mortgage market. 
New credit flows to the non-financial private sector have gradually slowed in 2019 and, in recent months, they have contracted in practically 
all segments. The cost for companies of financing with fixed-income securities have fallen sharply, and companies have taken advantage of 
this to increase their resort to corporate bond financing.
NON-FINANCIAL PRIVATE SECTOR FINANCING CONDITIONS
Chart 1.8
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Calculated taking 3-month cumulative flows.
b The interest rates on bank loans are NDER (narrowly defined effective rate).
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There has been some tightening of mortgage lending standards, as the weight of more leveraged mortgages (with an LTV and LTP of over 80%) 
has fallen, and the average LTV/LTP of the new mortgages has also declined.
MORTGAGE LENDING STANDARDS
Chart 1.9
SOURCE: Spanish Association of Registrars.
a In the distributions, the principal of the loans (by period) is accumulated to define each segment within the distribution. The average of the LTV and 
of the LTP is weighted in accordance with the capital of each mortgage.
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The	reduction	in	the	outstanding	balance	of	bank	credit	has	been	maintained	
in construction and real estate development activities. The year-on-year rate of 
decline was 12.5% in June 2019, entailing a more moderate fall-off than that observed 
at end-2018 (18.7%). This would be mainly due to the still-high volume of repayments 
and the sale of non-performing loan portfolios by credit institutions. 
1.3  The non-financial sectors 
1.3.1 Financial position and credit developments 
New	lending	flows	to	the	non-financial	private	sector	decelerated	gradually	
during	 2019,	 having	 shrunk	 in	 practically	 all	 segments	 in	 recent	 months 
(see Chart 1.8). As the BLS suggests, this would be due both to supply-side 
factors, especially in the case of mortgages, and demand-side factors. Despite 
the tightening in lending standards, bank financing costs for households and 
firms generally held at very low levels and without significant changes. In the 
case of firms, the cost of fixed-income securities issues has fallen sharply 
since the start of the year, thereby raising their attractiveness relative to 
bank loans. 
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The	 outstanding	 balance	 of	 financing	 raised	 by	 households	 continued	 to	
expand	at	a	very	contained	rate	(0.3%	in	August). The consumer credit segment 
has been the most dynamic to date, with a year-on-year growth rate of 10.2% in 
August (see Chart 1.10). According to the BLS, banks perceive less creditworthiness 
in this segment, which should also be consistent with the increase in NPLs 
recently observed. 
In	this	setting,	households’	financial	position	has	continued	to	strengthen	in	
recent	months,	albeit	at	a	 lesser	pace.	Gross household disposable income 
increased by over 4% year-on-year in the first half of the year, boosted by the rise in 
wages and the fall in unemployment. The household debt-GDP ratio fell by 0.4 pp 
to 58.6%, scarcely 0.6 pp above the euro area average. The interest burden 
associated with debt has also diminished during this period. Lastly, net household 
wealth continued to expand owing both to the increase in the financial and the 
real estate components.
In	the	first	half	of	2019,	there	was	a	step-up	in	the	rise	the	household	saving	
rate	 had	 begun	 to	 show	 in	 late	 2018.	 The moderation in the growth of 
consumption and the rise in income led the household saving rate, in proportion 
to household gross disposable income, to stand at 8.7%, 1.8 pp above the 
end-2018 level. As a result, the rate of saving not earmarked for debt service 
Of note in terms of financing is the buoyancy of consumer credit for households and the financing obtained through debt issuance for firms.
FINANCING TO HOUSEHOLDS AND NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS
Chart 1.10
SOURCES: Banco de España and Datastream.
a Excluding securitisation.
b Includes issues by resident subsidiaries.
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is expected to be close to zero, after having been in negative figures over 
recent years. 
Overall	external	funding	by	non-financial	corporations	continued	to	expand	at	
a	 year-on-year	 rate	 of	 close	 to	 2%.	 In terms of components, corporate bond 
financing has been growing strongly (see Chart 1.10), assisted by the declines in market 
interest rates, particularly in the medium and long-term tranches (see Chart 1.8). 
This would partly explain the fall-off observed since the start of the year in new bank 
lending to non-financial corporations. However, repayment dynamics enabled the 
outstanding balance of credit provided to firms by resident banks to actually increase 
slightly, in year-on-year terms, in August. Lastly, the financing obtained abroad by 
firms has contracted slightly in the most recent period; however, this behaviour has 
been much influenced by one-off operations. 
The	 financial	 position	 of	 non-financial	 corporations	 has	 continued	 to	
improve,	 but	 signs	 of	 a	 downturn	 in	 profitability	 are	 beginning	 to	 be	
discernible. In the first six months of the year, the corporate debt ratio continued 
to fall. This decline took the ratio to 73.4% of GDP, 1.1 pp less than in December 
2018, and 4.3 pp below the euro area average. Combined with the low cost of 
debt, these developments have prompted a fresh decline in the sector’s debt 
burden, marking another historical low. However, the ordinary profits of the non-
financial corporations drawn from the Banco de España Central Balance Sheet 
Data Office sample increased by scarcely 1.4% in the first half of the year, far 
down on the same period the previous year (8.4%), while the return on assets 
declined by 0.2 pp to 4%.
Firms’	debt	burden	declines	as	their	profitability	increases. In fact, it stands 
at close to 20% for firms in the lowest three deciles (see Chart 1.11). By firm size, 
an inverted U relationship is obtained, with medium-sized firms those that have to 
make most effort to meet their financial obligations. Chart 1.11 also highlights the 
fact that the debt burden increased significantly for all firms during the last crisis. 
This increase came about even though deleveraging had commenced some years 
earlier. Behind this behaviour are, above all, the decline in gross operating profit 
during the crisis and the rise in interest rates. This latter element underscores 
the potential sensitivity of firms’ financial position to a downturn in profits and a 
rise in rates. 
In	 recent	 months,	 public-sector	 financing	 costs	 have	 fallen	 significantly	
(see Chart 1.12). Spanish sovereign debt returns posted historical lows in 
August, standing at 0.04% for the 10-year maturity. In this context, the Treasury 
followed a strategy in which the issue of long-term instruments was to the fore. 
That allowed a further lengthening of the average life of overall outstanding debt, 
which stood at 7.5 years in September. Moreover, net Treasury issuance in 2019 
has declined, posting its lowest level since 2007. 
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The	public	sector’s	high	debt	continues	to	be	a	major	source	of	vulnerability	
for	the	Spanish	economy.	True, the general government deficit has fallen in recent 
years, thanks essentially to the economic pick-up; but it was still at 2.5% of GDP in 
2018, ranking second-highest in the euro area. Also, in June 2019 the public 
debt/GDP ratio stood at 98.9%, a level still 13 pp higher than the euro area average. 
While this high level of indebtedness does not translate into a burgeoning debt burden 
owing to low financing costs, it is a significant factor of vulnerability for the Spanish 
economy ahead of potential increases in funding costs on markets or of a 
The interest burden of debt is diminishing as firms’ profitability rises. In terms of corporate size, an inverted U relationship is obtained, with 
medium-sized corporations those that have to make the greatest effort to meet their financial obligations. The interest burden of debt 
increased significantly for all firms until 2013, despite deleveraging, being in 2017 lower than in 2008.
FIRMS' FINANCIAL POSITION (a)
Chart 1.11
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Firms’ balance sheet and income statement information is drawn from the Banco de España Central Balance Sheet Data Office. Financial firms and 
companies from the construction and real estate development sector are excluded.
b The new loans of a period are defined as all the first-time loans arranged with customers and all the contracts existing in earlier periods whose 
amount, interest rate, maturity or other significant financial conditions in relation to interest rates have been renegotiated with customers in the 
month in question.
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macroeconomic downturn. The lengthening of public debt maturities seen since 
2013 might partly mitigate this risk by reducing refinancing requirements.
Likewise,	the	high	negative	net	international	investment	position	(IIP)	is	another	
major	vulnerability	for	the	Spanish	economy	in	the	face	of	potential	changes	in	
international	financial	market	sentiment.	The Spanish economy’s negative net IIP, 
as a percentage of GDP, has declined by around 18 pp since 2014. However, in June 
2019 it still stood at over 79.9% of GDP, far above the euro area average (see Chart 
1.12). Gross external debt amounted to 171.6% of GDP in 2019 Q2, only 3.9 pp below 
the high recorded in 2015 Q1, though similar to that of other comparable countries. 
The fact that most of this gross external debt has a lengthy maturity, is denominated 
in euro and is issued by general government would alleviate, to some extent, 
refinancing risk. 
1.3.2 Other interconnections with the financial sector 
The	main	 financial	assets	 in	which	households	 invest	 their	gross	wealth	are	
deposits	 (38.2%	 of	 the	 total	 in	 March	 2019).	 Post-2015, deposits had been 
diminishing in significance in household portfolios relative to investment funds. 
Specifically, households’ holdings in investment funds grew in cumulative terms by 
40.2%, while deposits increased by only 7.9% over these five years, due in part to the 
progressive reduction in the return on them in an environment of very low interest 
General government financing costs have fallen significantly, while the Spanish economy’s net debtor position remains at high levels from 
both a historical and international perspective.
PUBLIC DEBT FINANCING COST AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POSITION
Chart 1.12
SOURCES: Banco de España, Spanish Treasury and ECB.
a Average interest rate on issues made during the month.
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rates. However, a significant rebound can be seen in the volume of deposits in 2019 
(5.7% year-on-year), despite the fact that the return on them is practically zero. 
The increase has been far above the rates of change recorded for other financial 
assets (see Chart 1.13). It is estimated that the low returns on fixed-income securities 
have lessened the interest in investing in assets linked to such securities, whereas 
the volatility of equities has discouraged direct and indirect investment in these 
instruments in a setting of high uncertainty (see Chart 1.5). 
Households' financial assets have increased in the past five years by close to 10% to €2.2 trillion as at March 2019. While the composition 
of the financial assets portfolio has held stable in this period, investment funds and, to a lesser extent, deposits have grown notably, set 
against the reduction in cash and fixed-income.
HOUSEHOLDS' FINANCIAL POSITION
Chart 1.13
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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Uncertainty related to the form and date of the United 
Kingdom’s departure from the European Union (Brexit) 
continues at the time of this report going to press 
(see Chart 1). Against this backdrop, this Box describes 
how the climate of uncertainty associated with the Brexit 
negotiations is affecting the country’s economic situation 
and analyses the exposure of Spain’s economy and 
banking sector to the United Kingdom. It also describes 
the contingency measures adopted by the European 
Commission and the Spanish government in relation to 
the financial system in the event of a no-deal Brexit.
The extension agreed by the European Council in April 
2019 managed to delay the risk of a disorderly exit of the 
United Kingdom from the EU until 31 October 2019 in view 
of the British Parliament’s failure to ratify the withdrawal 
deal negotiated with the previous government. More 
recently, on 17 October 2019, the European Union and the 
current British Government, led by Boris Johnson, signed 
a new agreement obviating a customs and regulatory 
border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern 
Ireland. At the cut-off date for this report, however, persisting 
difficulties over the timely ratification of the agreement 
have led the European Council to adopt, as requested by 
the British Government at the behest of Parliament, an 
additional extension. In this case the extension will be 
flexible, running to 31 January 2020 at the latest. This 
extension should, in principle, enhance the possibility of 
an agreement between the parties. But it cannot be ruled 
out that the ultimate terms of the future relationship 
between the United Kingdom and the European Union 
may involve a lesser degree of integration between both 
economies than the previous agreement.
The prolonged period of uncertainty following the 2016 
Brexit referendum has affected the British economy, which 
has worsened notably in recent months. As Chart 2 shows, 
the UK maintained relatively high GDP growth rates after the 
referendum, while monetary and fiscal policy decisions 
were able to sustain domestic demand and exports. 
However, high uncertainty impacted corporate investment, 
which weakened significantly (see Chart 3) and remained 
virtually flat as a percentage of GDP, in contrast with other 
cycles. Also, some British firms have directed their 
investments towards EU-27 countries, setting up subsidiaries 
that allow them to keep accessing this market. By contrast, 
Box 1.1
SPAIN’S	MACROECONOMIC	AND	FINANCIAL	EXPOSURE	TO	THE	UNITED	KINGDOM	IN	THE	EVENT 
OF A NO-DEAL BREXIT
SOURCES: Eurostat, EPU, ONS and Bank of England.
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1  H. Breinlichy, E. Leromainz, D. Novyx and T. Sampson (2019), Voting with their Money: Brexit and Outward Investment by UK Firms, 
with	survey	information	available	until	March	2019,	find	that	the	number	of	FDI	transactions	of	the	United	Kingdom	in	the	EU27	rose	
by 17% since the referendum, while FDI transactions aimed at other non-EU OECD countries hardly changed. Conversely, FDI 
transactions from EU27 declined by 9%. See also N. Bloom, P. Bunn, S. Chen, P. Mizen, P. Smietanka and G. Thwaites (2019), Bank 
of England, Staff Working Paper 818, The Impact of Brexit on UK Firms. 
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Box 1.1
SPAIN’S	MACROECONOMIC	AND	FINANCIAL	EXPOSURE	TO	THE	UNITED	KINGDOM	IN	THE	EVENT 
OF A NO-DEAL BREXIT (cont’d)
the number of investment projects of EU-27 countries in the 
United Kingdom decreased by 9% after the referéndum.1 
More recently, GDP growth figures available for 2019 H1 
show some volatility associated with the inventory build-up 
process which took place in Q1 in view of the proximity 
of the first exit date agreed (31 March). However, the fall in 
industrial production, the decrease in corporate and 
consumer confidence to record lows and the recent 
slowdown in retail sales point to a gradual weakening of 
the British economy. European economies are already 
affected by lower demand from the United Kingdom, 
especially those with a greater commercial exposure to 
this economy (see Chart 4). In addition to the above-
mentioned fall in direct foreign investment flows, euro area 
exports to the United Kingdom post negative rates since 
mid-2016, with a cumulative decline of nearly 10% in real 
terms up to July 2019. But the effects of a possible no-
deal Brexit would be much more disruptive for both parties, 
given their strong current commercial and financial links 
and the potential impact of this scenario on the financial 
markets. In particular, according to the latest Bank of 
England estimates, in the event of a no-deal Brexit, 
the United Kingdom’s GDP would drop to 5.5% over 
5 years below the baseline scenario from 2020 H1, while 
the unemployment rate and inflation would rise to 7% and 
5.3%, respectively.
The Spanish economy’s exposure to the United Kingdom is 
significant. Therefore, a no-deal departure would have 
notable consequences. The volume of goods trade with the 
United Kingdom, which would be negatively affected by 
the increase in tariffs to the levels currently in force for third 
countries, is not particularly high, but is significant. Spanish 
exports of goods to the United Kingdom account for 1.7% 
of GDP, a percentage that is lower than the average for the 
euro area (2.6%), although the agri-food sector’s exposure 
is higher. In services, the exposure of Spain’s economy to 
the United Kingdom (1.6% of GDP) is higher. In this case, 
some specific areas, such as the tourism sector, could be 
especially affected. The United Kingdom is the main country 
of origin of tourist flows to Spain, representing around 20% 
of tourist inflows and of total spending. This is compounded 
by the exposure of financial services and telecommunications 
export firms.2 As a whole, it is estimated that the cost 
through these channels of a disorderly exit of the United 
Kingdom for the Spanish economy may be substantial 
(around 0.7 pp of GDP in 5 years).3 
SOURCES: Eurostat, EPU, ONS and Bank of England.
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SOURCES: Eurostat, EPU, ONS and Bank of England.
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2  The second-home market, which traditionally attracted many British citizens, particularly in the Mediterranean provinces, is one of 
the most exposed sectors to a no-deal Brexit.
3  See Vega (2019), Brexit: current situation and outlook, Occasional Paper No 1905 of the Banco de España. 
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As regards the banking sector’s exposure, the foreign 
banks with the greatest weight in the British financial 
system are the Spanish, US, German and French banks. 
As a whole, they exceed 50% of the exposures of foreign 
banks in the United Kingdom, according to the latest 
available the data published by the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS), which related to June 2019.4 Spain has 
the highest exposure (16.1%), followed by the United 
States (15.9%). As regards other European countries, 
Germany (10.6%), France (8.2%) and the Netherlands 
(4%) have the greatest exposures (see Chart 5).
However, from the perspective of each of these countries, 
the importance of these exposures will depend on the size 
of their respective banking sectors. Thus, according to 
data published by the European Banking Authority (EBA), 
in the latest transparency exercise relating to June 2018, 
Irish banks appear to be the ones most exposed in relative 
terms, followed by Spanish banks (23.8% and 14%, 
respectively, of exposure to the United Kingdom as a 
percentage of total exposure). The exposure of Germany, 
France and the Netherlands to the United Kingdom was 
below 5% of the total exposure (see Chart 6).5 In absolute 
terms, Spain, together with France and Germany, were 
the countries with the highest volume.
The exposure of Spanish banks is mainly concentrated 
in loans, accounting for more than 85% of their financial 
assets in the United Kingdom as at June 2019. Household 
loans (54.9%) and, more specifically, mortgage loans, 
have the highest weight in total exposure (see Chart 7).
Over a longer time frame, an increase is observed in the 
volume of loans of Spanish banks in the United Kingdom 
from the levels of December 2014. Also, the NPL ratio 
decreased from 1.6% in December 2014 to below 1% in 
June 2019 (see Chart 8). 
In any event, in order to assess the potential impact of a 
no-deal Brexit on Spanish credit institutions, it should 
be taken into account that these exposures arise from 
the activity of subsidiaries with financial autonomy and 
a retail-oriented business model. This means that the 
main risk would be the potential deterioration of the British 
economy, which would entail a significant increase 
in NPL ratios and the possible depreciation of the 
pound sterling.
Box 1.1
SPAIN’S	MACROECONOMIC	AND	FINANCIAL	EXPOSURE	TO	THE	UNITED	KINGDOM	IN	THE	EVENT 
OF A NO-DEAL BREXIT (cont’d)
4  See CBS (2019) of the BIS.
5  See transparency exercise (2018) of the EBA.
SOURCES: BIS, EBA and Banco de España.
a Chart 5 shows the outstanding balance of loans based on the direct counterparty according to the consolidated banking statistics (CBS) of the BIS.
b Chart 6 shows the credit exposure to the United Kingdom of the main banks in EU countries (other than the United Kingdom), and the weight in 
total exposure.
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Box 1.1
SPAIN’S	MACROECONOMIC	AND	FINANCIAL	EXPOSURE	TO	THE	UNITED	KINGDOM	IN	THE	EVENT 
OF A NO-DEAL BREXIT (cont’d)
In terms of financial institutions’ operations, a disorderly 
Brexit could also give rise to financial market turbulence 
and to risks to Central Counterparty Clearing House (CCP) 
operations. In the latter case, mitigating measures have 
been adopted both in Europe and in Spain. The European 
Commission has expanded its consideration of CCPs that 
are eligible to operate with European financial institutions.6 
In Spain, the government approved Royal Decree-Law 
5/2019 of 1 March 2019 to ensure the continuity of financial 
contracts in case of a no-deal Brexit, including a 
requirement for British financial institutions operating 
in Spain to adapt their operations to national regulations 
as well as a transitional arrangement to facilitate this 
adaptation without disrupting operations.7
6  In December 2018 the European Commission issued an implementing decision determining, for a limited period of time, that the 
regulatory framework applicable to CCPs in the United Kingdom is equivalent to that existing for CCPs within the European Union 
in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. The expiration date is 30 March 2020. A decision on equivalence, temporary and 
conditional, of the framework applicable to central securities depositories (CSDs) was also adopted. It expires on 30 March 2021.
7  See Royal Decree-Law 5/2019 and briefing	note of the Banco de España.
SOURCES: BIS, EBA and Banco de España.
a Chart 5 shows the outstanding balance of loans based on the direct counterparty according to the consolidated banking statistics (CBS) of the BIS.
b Chart 6 shows the credit exposure to the United Kingdom of the main banks in EU countries (other than the United Kingdom), and the weight in 
total exposure.
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SOURCES: BIS, EBA and Banco de España.
a Chart 5 shows the outstanding balance of loans based on the direct counterparty according to the consolidated banking statistics (CBS) of the BIS.
b Chart 6 shows the credit exposure to the United Kingdom of the main banks in EU countries (other than the United Kingdom), and the weight in 
total exposure.
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Box 1.2
HE	ECB’S	RECENT	MONETARY	POLICY	DECISIONS	AND	THEIR	POSSIBLE	EFFECTS	ON	BANK	PROFITABILITY	
The euro area’s macroeconomic outlook has worsened 
considerably during the course of 2019. In particular, 
inflation decreased to 1% in July and the ECB’s September 
forecast is for a rather weak recovery to 1.5% in 2021, well 
below the levels which may be considered consistent with 
the aim of holding inflation below, but close to, 2%. The 
ECB also revised downward the GDP growth forecast to 
1.1% in 2019, 1.2% in 2020 and 1.4% in 2021. In view of 
this situation, at its 12 September meeting the ECB 
Governing Council adopted a series of monetary policy 
measures to ensure the sustained convergence of inflation 
towards its inflation aim. 
The first of these measures was to lower the deposit facility 
rate by 10 basis points (bp) to –0.50%. Simultaneously, the 
Governing Council reinforced its forward guidance on 
interest rates. The Governing Council expects the key ECB 
interest rates to remain at their present or lower levels until 
it sees the inflation outlook robustly converge to a level 
sufficiently close to, but below, 2% within its projection 
horizon, and such convergence is consistently reflected in 
observed inflation dynamics. These measures seek to 
maintain an ample degree of monetary accommodation, 
particularly in the short to medium-term segments of the 
yield curve.
Second, it was decided to restart net asset purchases 
under the asset purchase programme at a monthly pace of 
€20 billion as from 1 November. The duration of this 
programme is undefined and the Governing Council 
expects it to end shortly before it starts raising the key 
ECB interest rates. The aim is to extend monetary 
accommodation to the long end of the yield curve.
Third, the modalities of the new series of quarterly targeted 
longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO III), which 
commenced in September, were changed. The interest 
rates applicable were reduced and the maturity of the 
operations was extended from two to three years. The aim 
of these adjustments is to preserve favourable bank 
lending conditions.
Finally, it was decided to introduce a two-tier system for 
reserve remuneration, in which the negative deposit 
facility rate (–0.5%) does not apply to a portion of banks’ 
holdings of excess liquidity (i.e. their reserve holdings in 
excess of minimum reserve requirements). The purpose 
of this decision is to support the bank-based transmission 
of monetary policy in a negative interest rate environment. 
The financial markets began to anticipate this 
accommodative bias of monetary policy, stepped up 
following Draghi’s speech at Sintra on 18 June. This was 
reflected in lower interbank and debt market rates, 
particularly at longer terms (see Chart 1). 
The effects of these monetary policy measures on bank 
profitability are transmitted through various channels and 
may be of differing sign. This makes the overall net impact 
difficult to quantify. 
On the downside, these measures may contribute to a 
narrowing of the spread between lending rates and deposit 
SOURCES: Banco de España and Datastream.
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rates. Indeed, falls in market interest rates may be expected 
to pass through to the return on lending to a greater 
extent than to the cost of deposits, since the latter has 
practically no room left before it turns negative. The 
remuneration of loans at variable interest rates, which 
accounts for a notable proportion of medium and long-
term loans, will progressively adjust to the new prices as 
they are adjusted in line with changes in the reference 
indices (this usually occurs with a lag of less than one year). 
Furthermore, if the decreases pass through to new 
transactions, as usually occurs, there will also be a cut in 
the average remuneration of assets through this channel. 
In previous bouts of interest rate cuts, the impact of the 
fall in loan remuneration was largely counteracted by a 
decrease in the cost of deposits. Indeed, the loan-deposit 
spread remained very stable both in new lending and in 
outstanding balances (see Charts 2 and 3). In fact, in the 
latter it has even widened somewhat in recent years, 
reflecting the favourable effect of the lower NPLs and the 
higher relative weight of consumer credit, with its wider 
margins. However, on this occasion the accommodative 
bias of monetary policy might be expected to cause the 
loan-deposit spread to narrow because there is little room 
to further reduce the average cost of deposits, since it is 
already near to zero.
Moreover, there is abundant theoretical and empirical 
evidence that, in a low interest rate environment, 
financial intermediaries may opt for more risky transactions 
in a quest for higher returns.1 This is what is known as the 
“credit risk-taking channel” of monetary policy and it 
suggests that, to correctly assess the impact that measures 
of this type have on returns, it is necessary to take into 
account the risk incurred and, in any event, to keep a close 
eye on risk-taking, so that macroprudential measures can 
be taken if risk grows excessively.  
On the upside, the monetary easing should help to improve 
economic activity and stimulate the flow of credit. The cost 
of wholesale bank funding has decreased significantly, 
coinciding with the intensification of the expansionary 
monetary policy, and in this case the value of zero does not 
act as a lower limit. Indeed, the average cost of some 
financing instruments, such as covered bonds, is now 
negative (see Chart 4). The lower cost of wholesale funding 
will also prompt the issuance of securities forming part of 
MREL (minimum required eligible liabilities), which banks 
must hold so that, in the event of resolution, they can be 
recapitalised by bail-in rather than bail-out.
Additionally, it should be taken into account that two 
measures approved by the ECB Governing Council 
Box 1.2
HE	ECB’S	RECENT	MONETARY	POLICY	DECISIONS	AND	THEIR	POSSIBLE	EFFECTS	ON	BANK	PROFITABILITY	(cont’d)
SOURCES: Banco de España and Datastream.
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1  See, for example, D. Martínez Miera and R. Repullo (2017): “Search for yield”, Econometrica, 85, pp. 351-378, or G. Jiménez, S. 
Ongena, J. L. Peydró and J. Saurina (2014): “Hazardous times for monetary policy: What do 23 million loans say about the impact 
of monetary policy on credit risk-taking?”, Econometrica 82, pp. 463-505. 
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(more favourable conditions on TLTRO III and the 
exemption of a reserve tranche) will contribute to raising 
per-unit net interest income (difference between the return 
on assets and the cost of liabilities expressed in terms of 
the volume of assets) of banks. All this should serve to 
moderate the narrowing of the net interest margin.
Other potentially favourable effects of the accommodative 
bias of monetary policy on bank profitability will flow 
through various channels. Firstly, the fall in yields on the 
debt securities held in banks’ portfolios affected by the 
new measures (particularly the restarting of the asset 
purchase programme) and the consequent rise in their 
market price will generate gains. However, this effect 
gradually fades once interest rates stop falling and, 
moreover, in recent years banks have substantially reduced 
their holdings in the available-for-sale portfolio, which, 
since it is valued at market price, is where such gains 
are recorded. 
Secondly, the stimulus to the economy from the 
expansionary monetary policy measures and the lower 
cost of outstanding debt will have favourable effects on 
the quality of the credit portfolio, which will make for 
smaller credit losses and fewer non-earning assets (NPLs). 
Lastly, the prices of real assets in bank portfolios will also 
increase, although in recent years this effect has become 
less important as banks’ foreclosed asset portfolios 
have shrunk.
Box 1.2
HE	ECB’S	RECENT	MONETARY	POLICY	DECISIONS	AND	THEIR	POSSIBLE	EFFECTS	ON	BANK	PROFITABILITY	(cont’d)
Royal Decree-Law 22/2018 equipped the Banco de 
España with a broad range of macroprudential tools, 
including borrower-based measures. These instruments, 
which will be applicable to, inter alia, the mortgage 
portfolio, will focus on limiting the debt service burden of 
mortgage payments for borrowers, or on reducing the level 
of leverage with respect to the available collateral. They 
will thus contribute to improving borrower solvency, since 
experience has shown that when loan terms ease and 
leverage increases or a greater debt service burden falls 
on borrowers, the risk of default usually increases.
This box summarises the results of a study analysing the 
effect of credit standards (and of their interactions) on 
the level of mortgage credit risk.1 The exercise takes the 
terms and conditions of loans at their origination date and 
applies a battery of econometric models to estimate 
the probability of mortgage foreclosure proceedings or, 
alternatively, of a loan becoming non-performing. This 
analysis starts out by defining the indicators which other 
studies have found to be important2 for determining 
default risk. Thus, to measure leverage, two ratios were 
calculated which compare the loan amount with the 
house value: the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, the 
denominator of which is the house appraisal value, and 
the loan-to-price (LTP) ratio, the denominator of which 
is the registered price of the house purchase transaction. 
The financial burden of borrowers is proxied by the 
loan service-to-income (LSTI) ratio, which is the 
proportion of a borrower’s annual income used for loan 
repayments at the origination date. Lastly, other 
characteristics of mortgages are examined, such as 
maturity, house type and location, borrower charac-
teristics including employment status, and loan purpose.
Data from the Association of Registrars were used to 
develop a model to calculate the probability of mortgage 
foreclosure proceedings. Chart 1 shows that this probability 
tends to increase with increasing LTV and LTP ratios. 
However, the LTV ratio does not seem to show an effective 
association with higher risk for values above 80%. This is 
not so with the LTP ratio, for which risk grows more 
Box 1.3
CREDIT STANDARDS AND MORTGAGE DEFAULT RISK 
1  See Galán, J.E. and M. Lamas (2019). Beyond the LTV ratio: new macroprudential lessons from Spain. Working Paper 1931. Banco 
de España.
2  Us was made of two databases which contain a sample of loans and include the individual information on characteristics of 
mortgages	at	origination.	First,	we	took	information	from	the	Association	of	Registrars,	which	identifies	all	mortgages	taken	out	in	
Spain since before the crisis Second, we supplemented this information by that from a repository of securitisation data, namely the 
European DataWarehouse. In both cases, the information refers to house mortgages granted to individuals.
SOURCES: Spanish Association of Registrars (Colegio de Registradores) and European DataWarehouse.
a The probability of occurrence of the stress event (mortgage foreclosure or non-performance) is estimated for loans which in theory have the same 
characteristics and which only change in the value of their LTV, LTP, maturity or LSTI, depending on the chart. Except in the case where the LTV 
ratio is above 80%, the confidence intervals of these estimates are small, so the changes in probability are statistically significant.
b The LTP ratio is plotted on the horizontal axis.
c The index expresses the risk of new mortgage lending having regard to the volume of credit granted and to credit standards. The NPL ratio is that 
of loans for house purchase and renovation. The last year of this sample is 2017.
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markedly over the whole distribution. In this connection, 
the LTP ratio seems to be better at distinguishing the risk 
of mortgage transactions. This suggests that house values 
estimated through appraisals should be supplemented 
by the effective transaction value.
Additionally, other models were estimated using a 
database containing information on securitised loans and 
on borrowers’ main characteristics, including their income 
(European DataWarehouse). The results demonstrate the 
importance of taking into account the interactions between 
different measures of credit standards to explain the 
behaviour of troubled loans. In particular, Chart 2 shows 
the impact on the probability that loans will become non-
performing for different LSTI ratios and for two LTV ratios 
(70% and 90%). It can be seen that not only does risk 
increase as the borrower debt service burden rises, but 
also that the more highly leveraged loans (i.e. higher LTV 
ratio) are associated with a higher level of risk (and that it 
also rises more sharply). The probability of becoming non-
performing in Chart 2 is higher than the probability of 
mortgage foreclosure in Chart 1, since the stress event 
considered is different.3
Chart 3, in which once again information from the database 
of the Association of Registrars is used, plots the changes 
in the probability of mortgage foreclosure as a function of 
the LTP ratio for two mortgage maturities (20 and 30 years). 
It can be seen that maturity starts to become an additional 
determinant of risk for high leverage values. From the 
standpoint of use of regulatory instruments, these results 
indicate that the simultaneous activation of limits on 
various credit standards would be more effective than the 
implementation of just one of them.
Lastly, the quantitative results of the study allow the 
construction of indicators to monitor the mortgage risk 
Box 1.3
CREDIT STANDA DS AND MORTGAGE DEFAULT RISK (cont’d)
SOURCES: Spanish Association of Registrars (Colegio de Registradores) and European DataWarehouse.
a The probability of occurrence of the stress event (mortgage foreclosure or non-performance) is estimated for loans which in theory have the same 
characteristics and which only change in the value of their LTV, LTP, maturity or LSTI, depending on the chart. Except in the case where the LTV 
ratio is above 80%, the confidence intervals of these estimates are small, so the changes in probability are statistically significant.
b The LTP ratio is plotted on the horizontal axis.
c The index expresses the risk of new mortgage lending having regard to the volume of credit granted and to credit standards. The NPL ratio is that 
of loans for house purchase and renovation. The last year of this sample is 2017.
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3	 	In	the	securitised	loan	database	(European	DataWarehouse),	all	inflows	into	NPLs	form	part	of	the	sample	of	troubled	loans.	In	the	
Association of Registrars, the sample of troubled loans is constructed from the mortgages subject to foreclosure proceedings. This, 
along with the differing coverage of troubled loans in the two databases, explains the higher probability of the stress event in the 
securitised loan database.
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related to the credit standards at the mortgage origination 
date. Thus Chart 4 depicts the behaviour of a mortgage-
loan-at-risk index, reflecting the variation over time of 
future troubled loans, given the credit standards at the 
origination date and the amount of credit granted each 
year.4 In general, the expected value of loans at risk was 
observed to increase significantly before the crisis, 
basically due to the worsening credit standards. These 
results contrast with the behaviour of the NPL rate of this 
portfolio, which remained low until the crisis, at which time 
it began to climb rapidly. The decrease in the risk indicator 
after the outbreak of the crisis seemed to be due to the 
sharp contraction in new mortgages and to the tightening 
of credit standards. These results suggest that the 
estimated index may be useful as a leading indicator of 
vulnerability in the mortgage market.
Box 1.3
CREDIT STANDARDS AND MORTGAGE DEFAULT RISK (cont’d)
4  To construct the mortgage-loan-at-risk index, the probability of default estimated by the model for the loans originated each year is 
multiplied by the total value of the mortgages granted in that year. It is thus a measure of the expected value of the mortgages 
originated in a given year which would be at risk of future default given the credit standards at the origination date. An increase 
(decrease)	in	this	index	may	reflect	an	increase	(decrease)	in	the	probability	of	default	in	the	year	the	loan	was	granted	(which	in	turn	
depends on the credit standards, including the LTV, LTP and LSI ratios), an increase (decrease) in the value of the mortgages granted 
that year, or an increase (decrease) in both. During the years of the sample assessed, on average 75% of the changes in the index 
were attributable to changes in the probability of default and 25% of them to changes in the value of the mortgages granted.
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This chapter reviews the situation and risks of the Spanish financial system, paying 
special attention to the banking sector. Furthermore, it presents the results of the stress 
tests conducted for this sector and also its direct interconnections with non-residents 
and indirect interconnections with the rest of the financial sector. Since the last FSR the 
Spanish banking sector has continued the process of deleveraging against a background 
of low profitability and slightly improving solvency. The quality of the balance sheet has 
also improved due to decreasing NPLs and foreclosed assets. The stress tests on 
the banking sector show adequate resilience at aggregate level, underpinned by the 
aforementioned improvement in balance sheet quality. Under the adverse scenario, 
the stress test analysis incorporates also a limited ability to generate operating income 
by banks and lower credit growth than under the baseline scenario. The results are 
sensitive to the value adjustment assumptions applied to sovereign exposures.
2.1 Deposit institutions
2.1.1 Balance sheet structure, risks and vulnerabilities
Credit risk
Total	lending	by	deposit	institutions	in	Spain	decreased	by	1.2%	year-on-year	
in	June	2019.	This was a significant moderation in the rate of fall, since in the same 
month a year earlier the decrease was 2.8%. As a result, total loans stood at €1,159 
billion (see Chart 2.1). The decrease in lending was apparent in all the larger lending 
banks and affected loans to non-financial corporations most (see Chart 2.2). 
However, the fact that the median of the distribution, which does not take into 
account size differences between banks, is positive and rising in the non-financial 
corporations segment, suggests that lending by smaller banks is expanding.
Year-on-year	growth	of	new	loans	to	households	and	non-financial	corporations	
moderated. Lending between June 2018 and June 2019 amounted to €459 billion, 
of which more than 70% were new loans (see Chart 2.1). In recent months new loans 
have held steady, so the year-on-year growth rate of new loans decreased to 4.6% 
and the increase in loan principal drawn down declined to 12.6%.
Financing	 extended	 by	 the	 banking	 sector	 to	 non-financial	 corporations	
through	 the	purchase	of	 their	debt	 issues	 increased	by	€1.9	billion	 in	2019.	 
2 RISKS TO THE FINANCIAL SECTOR AND ITS RESILIENCE
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Total credit continued falling to stand at €1,159 billion in June 2019, although a slight pick-up in the past quarter had the effect of moderating 
its year-on-year rate of fall. New lending held steady in the past twelve months, which meant that its year-on-year change also moderated.
CREDIT TO THE RESIDENT PRIVATE SECTOR
Business in Spain, ID
Chart 2.1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Before December 2016 information was not available on the increase in the principal drawn down in existing loans. Consequently, the first data 
item for this series, accumulated over twelve months, is represented in November 2017. The rate of change shown only refers to new loans.
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Credit to the resident private sector fell across the board in all the larger lending banks, although the median change at banks remained 
positive, both in total credit and, more particularly, in credit to non-financial corporations.
DISTRIBUTION BY INSTITUTION OF THE CHANGE IN CREDIT TO THE RESIDENT PRIVATE SECTOR
Business in Spain, ID
Chart 2.2
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The graph shows the density function (or frequency distribution) of the year-on-year change of credit for Spanish deposit institutions, weighted 
by the credit corresponding to each institution. This density function is approximated through a kernel estimator which allows a non-parametric 
estimate of the density function, yielding a continuous and smoothed graphical representation of that function.
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As shown in Chapter 1 (see Chart 1.10), the balance of outstanding debt issued by 
Spanish non-financial corporations has expanded significantly between 2016 and 
2019. Indeed, in June 2019 these securities represented 13.2% of total financing to 
non-financial corporations (see Chart 2.3). Deposit institutions can also finance 
these firms indirectly by acquiring those securities. Specifically, their holdings in 
June 2019 stood at €11 billion, up €3 billion compared to 2017. Hence, the weight of 
banks’ holdings in total issues held steady at slightly below 10%.
The	behaviour	of	 lending	was	underpinned	by	 the	stabilisation	of	 financing	
conditions. The interest rates on new loans have remained at much the same level 
over the past 12 months for both households and non-financial corporations. At mid-
2019, the approval rate of loans requested by non-financial corporations from banks 
with which they were not currently dealing stood at 31% of the total number of 
applications received, practically the same rate as a year earlier.
Forborne	 loans	 continued	 to	 decrease	 over	 the	 past	 year to stand at 5.4% 
of total credit to the resident private sector in June 2019. The year-on-year rate of 
change of these loans was –20.2%, a decline which was 2.7 pp smaller than a year 
earlier. This decrease was across the board in non-financial corporations (–21.3%) 
and households (–18.9%).
Although the main source of financing of non-financial corporations is bank loans, the weight of debt securities has increased by more than 
4 pp since March 2016 to stand at 13.2% in June 2019. The weight of debt securities issued by non-financial corporations that are held by 
deposit institutions decreased significantly at the beginning of the Eurosystem corporate bond purchase programme in June 2016, 
subsequently steadying at nearly 10% of the total debt issuance of these firms.
PARTICIPATION OF THE BANKING SECTOR IN THE FINANCING OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS
Bussines in Spain, ID
Chart 2.3
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Transferred loans include those removed from the balance sheet, those transferred to securitisation funds and other transfers.
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The	NPL	ratio	of	the	resident	private	sector	in	business	in	Spain	continued	to	
decrease	to	stand	at	5.3%	in	June	2019.	As a result, the cumulative decrease 
from the high in December 2013 is 8.7 pp (see Chart 2.4). In year-on-year terms, 
NPLs decreased by 17.6%, a smaller drop than in 2018, with a portion of the decline 
this year being due to wholesale disposals of NPL portfolios by some banks. The 
improved credit quality is generally observed in the various sectoral portfolios, 
except that of consumer credit, where the NPL ratio increased by 0.5 pp to 5.6% in 
the 12-month period to June 2019. 
However,	from	the	standpoint	of	flows	of	the	resident	private-sector	portfolio,	
the	inflows	of	new	NPLs	quickened	in	the	first	half	of	2019.	In the first six months 
of the year, inflows of NPLs reached €13.5 billion (see Chart 2.5). This behaviour 
represented an increase in NPL inflows with respect to the figure of €12.4 billion in 
the first half of 2018. However, the outflows of write-offs and recoveries were high 
enough to offset the behaviour of inflows, so the total volume of NPLs decreased in 
the first half of 2019.
Foreclosed	assets	decreased	by	€3.3	billion	 in	 the	 first	six	months	of	2019. 
Thus the downward trend of recent years continued (see Chart 2.4). Foreclosed 
assets have fallen by 50% from the high of 2011. Looking at their composition, those 
from construction and real estate development loans continue to account for more 
than half, while the relative proportion of those from household loans for house 
purchase decreased to 26.2%.
The NPL ratio of the resident private sector continued its decline of recent years to stand at 5.3% in June 2019, representing a fall of more 
than 1 pp with respect to the same month a year earlier. Foreclosed assets showed a further fall in June 2019 to stand below €40 billion.
NPL RATIO AND FORECLOSED ASSETS
Chart 2.4
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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The	consolidated	 total	 assets	of	Spanish	deposit	 institutions	grew	year-on-
year	by	3.4%	 in	June	2019.	This was mainly a result of their operations abroad, 
where their financial assets (particularly loans) increased by 10.5% year-on-year, 
while the financial assets of business in Spain decreased by 1.9%. This geographical 
diversification of Spanish banks took their financial assets abroad to above 50% of 
their total financial assets in June 2019.
Loans	 abroad	 from	 Spanish	 banks	 are	 concentrated	 in	 Europe	 and	 Latin	
America. In the last four years the relative weight of loans in the United Kingdom has 
decreased by nearly 5 pp, while that of loans in the rest of Europe has increased by 
more than 10 pp to 29.5%. The relative weight of loans in Latin America decreased 
to stand at 25.5% of total loans abroad in June 2019 (see Chart 2.6).
Consolidated	 non-performing	 assets,	 including	 loans	 and	 debt	 securities,	
decreased	 by	 12.4%	 year-on-year (see Annex 1). Hence the total NPL ratio 
decreased to 3%, down 54 bp from June 2018. In the past four years, NPLs abroad 
have decreased in all jurisdictions except Turkey, where the NPL ratio was 5.9% in 
June 2019 (2.2% in June 2015). The highest decrease in the ratio was in Portugal, 
where it fell by 4.7 pp to 4% (see Chart 2.6). 
Liquidity and financing conditions
In	 June	 2019,	 the	 liquidity	 coverage	 ratio	 (LCR)	 of	 Spanish	 banks	 stood	 at	
162.2%. It thus amply exceeded the regulatory minimum requirement (100%) 
In the first half of 2019, NPLs decreased to €61.9 billion. The rate of fall was more moderate than in previous periods. The rates of change 
of outflows to write-offs and of recoveries were similar to those in 2018 as a whole, while the rate of inflows to new NPLs was higher.
FLOW OF RESIDENT PRIVATE SECTOR NPLs (a)
Business in Spain, ID
Chart 2.5
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Shown beside each bar is the amount, in € billion, of each NPL inflow or outflow. NPLs recovered include non-performing loans that become 
performing again, and foreclosed assets and NPLs sold to third parties. The chart shows annual inflows and outflows to December 2018 and the 
flows in the first half of 2019.
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and also the European average (149.2%). Specifically, the data of the European 
Banking Authority (EBA)1 indicate that the ratio in Spain is higher than in the main 
EU countries. In the past 12 months the LCR has increased in Italy, Spain and 
France, while there has been a decrease in the liquidity of banks in Germany 
and, particularly, the United Kingdom (see Chart 2.7).
The	liquidity	provided	by	the	Eurosystem	to	the	banking	system	will	probably	
increase	as	a	result	of	the	monetary	easing	measures	recently	approved	by	
the ECB. In fact, the decision to reactivate net purchases from 1 November will 
entail a monthly increase in the Eurosystem balance sheet of €20 billion per month, 
following the stability prevailing since the beginning of this year. Meanwhile, the 
volume of refinancing operations has not varied significantly because the bulk of 
them relate to four long-term transactions known as TLTRO-II, which will not mature 
until June 20202 (see Chart 2.8). In March 2019 the Governing Council of the ECB 
decided to launch a new series of seven quarterly transactions between September 
2019 and March 2021 (TLTRO-III), the initial conditions of which were improved 
1 See https://eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/risk-dashboard.
2  Banks have the option of early redemption two years after the settlement of each transaction, which 
explains the decrease in the outstanding balance of these transactions from the €723 billion cited in 
the previous FSR. 
In the past four years, loans to Europe (excluding the United Kingdom) have increased to account for nearly 30% of loans abroad, while loans 
to the United Kingdom and Latin America have decreased by 5 pp. The NPL ratio abroad continues to be uneven across countries, with an 
across-the-board decline, except in Turkey where the ratio stood at 5.9% in June 2019.
LOANS ABROAD
Consolidated data
Chart 2.6
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The chart shows at each date the loans in each geographical area as a proportion of the total loans outside Spain.
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at its meeting on 12 September. The first tender assigned a relatively small amount,3 
possibly because the banks participating in this first tender were not aware of these 
new conditions. Box 1.2 sets out in detail the measures approved by the ECB’s 
Governing Council last September and their implications for financial stability.
Activity	on	 the	unsecured	money	markets	 in	 the	euro	area	continues	 to	be	
very	 low.	 The trading volume on the purely interbank market is very small and 
continues to decrease for the reasons analysed in previous FSRs4 (see Chart 2.8). 
By contrast, deposits at banks placed by financial institutions without access to the 
ECB deposit facility are much larger, as reflected by the higher average volume of 
trading indexed to the €STR rate, which has grown to somewhat more than €37 billion 
in 2019, compared with €2.5 billion of interbank loans indexed to EONIA.5 These 
banks have ample liquidity, partly as a result of the Eurosystem asset purchase 
programmes. This explains why the €STR rate, which also includes these transactions, 
is below the EONIA, which is calculated solely from loans between banks, and below 
3 €3,396 million	granted	to	28	banks.
4	 	Specifically,	the	excess	liquidity	in	the	system,	the	new	regulatory	framework and the preference for 
repo transactions secured by high-quality collateral. 
5	 	The	 reference	 market	 for	 setting	 the	 €STR	 rate	 includes	 all	 bank	 deposits	 placed	 by	 financial	
institutions (not necessarily banks). By contrast, the EONIA is set using as a reference only interbank 
transactions.
The liquidity coverage ratio at European level was 149.2% in June 2019 (compared with 148.3% in June 2018). The EU countries as a whole 
had a ratio above the required minimum of 100%, except for Greece (where it has, however, increased significantly in the past year).
LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO. EUROPEAN COMPARISON
SSM COUNTRIES AND UNITED KINGDOM. June 2019 (a)
Chart 2.7
SOURCE: EBA.
a The data refer to a sample of 150 institutions, and the LCR is calculated as the weighted average of the ratios of each country’s institutions.
b The sovereign debt crisis prompted Greek banks to use their LCR liquidity buffer, resulting in LCR levels below the required minimum of 100% (as 
from December 2017, when Greece reported for the first time on the LCR ratio, which has since stood below 100%). Article 4(3) of Commission 
Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/61 of 10 October 2014 allows liquid assets to be monetised in periods of tension.
c EBA data include Iceland.
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Activity on the unsecured money markets in the euro area continues to be very low, while the secured money markets (repos) increasingly 
account for the bulk of the volume traded on the European markets. In the first three quarters of 2019, Spanish banks stepped up their 
aggregate issuance with respect to the same period of 2018.
WHOLESALE FUNDING
Chart 2.8
SOURCES: Bloomberg, Dealogic, Eikon, Thomson Reuters and Banco de España.
a Includes covered bonds, senior debt, subordinated debt eligible as tier 2 capital and debt eligible as additional tier 1 capital. Retained issues are 
not included.
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even the deposit facility rate (DFR). In any event, both the EONIA and the €STR 
reflect in full the ECB’s decision to lower the DFR by 10 bp6 (see Chart 2.8). 
The	September	Governing	Council	meeting	also	decided	to	apply	a	two-step	
remuneration	system	to	the	reserves	deposited	by	deposit	institutions	at	the	
central bank. This exempted them from paying the DFR (–0.5%) over an amount 
equal to six times the minimum reserve, which is remunerated at the rate on main 
refinancing operations (0.0%). Assuming that the reserves of Spanish banks in this 
deposit facility do not change, it is estimated that a moderate benefit will result from 
the introduction of this remuneration system. Meanwhile, for those banks with non-
exempt surplus reserves, the positive effect will be partially mitigated by the decline 
in the deposit facility rate to –0.5%, which will somewhat reduce the net effect of the 
two measures announced.
The	secured	money	markets	(repos)	increasingly	account	for	the	bulk	of	the	
volume	 traded	 on	 the	 European	 money	 markets. These markets are used 
by banks to manage their growing need for collateral derived largely from changes 
in banking regulation, against a background of low collateral availability due to 
scant security issuance and the ECB purchase programmes. In this respect, it 
should be noted that at mid-September tensions emerged in the US dollar repo 
market when a sharp rise in repo rates pushed the FED monetary policy reference 
rate to the high band of its target range (which it exceeded on some occasions). 
This event led the FED to intervene7 in order to reduce repo rates to their normal 
levels and keep its official interest rate within the target range. The euro area was 
not affected and the repo rate in fact decreased in line with the cut in the DFR 
(see Chart 2.8).
In	the	first	three	quarters	of	2019,	Spanish	banks	stepped	up	their	issuance	of	
debt	instruments	compared	with	the	same	period	of	2018. However, there was 
a certain unevenness by type of debt instrument, as follows. The volume of covered 
bonds and, in particular, senior debt, increased (see Chart 2.8) and, contrariwise, the 
issuance of subordinated debt, particularly that eligible as additional Tier 1 capital, 
decreased with respect to the same period a year earlier. As to the cost of issuance 
by type of instrument, this showed the opposite behaviour. The cost of subordinated 
debt, whether eligible as Tier 1 or Tier 2, increased, and that of senior debt and 
covered bonds decreased (see Chart 2.8).
The	 outstanding	 balance	 of	 resident	 private-sector	 deposits	 continued	 to	
increase,	 driven	 by	 sight	 deposits.	 The negative interest rate environment 
6 Decision of the ECB Governing Council of 12 September 2019.
7  The interventions were made through a series of overnight repos and three transactions with a 
maturity of 14 days. 
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has caused the remuneration of new time deposits by the resident private sector 
to decrease significantly since 2015 and converge with the interest rates on sight 
deposits, at around 0%.8 It is therefore not surprising that the volume of new 
time deposits has also fallen and in June 2019 it stood below 2% of the outstanding 
balance of sight deposits, compared with relative weights above 15% in 2013 (see 
Chart 2.9). Thus the outstanding balance of time deposits was down to 16.3% of the 
total in June 2019, compared with 53.2% in June 2013, showing year-on-year rates 
of change below –10% since end-2014, as against growth rates above 10% for sight 
deposits (see Chart 2.9).
2.1.2 Profitability and solvency
Profitability
In	the	first	half	of	2019,	the	consolidated	profit	attributable	to	the	parent	entity	
of	 the	 Spanish	 banking	 system	 as	 a	whole	was	 down	 11.5%	 year-on-year.	
8	 	Rates	have	even	turned	negative	 in	the	case	of	non-financial	corporations.	However,	the	negative	
rates seem to be rather exceptional, since the volume of new time deposits is very low (less than 
€5,000 million per month) in comparison with new demand deposits (more than €200,000 million), 
and they relate to specialised operations.
Interest rates on new time deposits by the resident private sector have decreased significantly in recent years to levels near 0%. This trend in 
deposit yields has been accompanied by a lower volume of new time deposits, whose relative weight has fallen with respect to the outstanding 
balance of sight deposits. Furthermore, the outstanding balance of time deposits has also declined, albeit more slowly than in previous years, 
while sight deposits continue to grow.
RETAIL FUNDING
Business in Spain, ID
Chart 2.9
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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Consequently, the returns on assets (ROA) and on equity (ROE)9 fell by 8 bp and 
1 pp, to 0.49% and 6.6%, respectively. As seen in Chart 2.10, the decrease in the 
ROA was broadly based across institutions, although it was larger in the case of 
the more profitable ones. Chart 2.10 also shows that in many institutions the 
decline in the ROA was a result of the fact that the increase in their assets in 
the period was not accompanied by a sufficient improvement in profit to sustain the 
rate of return.
The	decline	in	profit	is	explained	by	a	significant	reduction	in	gains	on	financial	
assets	 and	 liabilities,	 while	 extraordinary	 operating	 expenses	 and,	 for	 the	
first	 time	since	2012,	 impairment	 losses	 increased	 (see Chart 2.11). Gains on 
financial assets and liabilities were down 33% (6 bp in terms of ATA), which resulted 
in a slight decline (0.3%) in gross income. Operating expenses rose by almost 4%, 
leading to a fall in net operating income of 4.5%. The increase in operating expenses 
over the past year has been largely due to agreements to reduce staff at certain 
9	 	To	calculate	the	ROA	and	ROE	ratios	used	in	this	section,	the	numerators	are	net	profit	attributable	to	
the parent entity, while the denominators are four-quarter averages of total assets (ROA) and of 
own	 funds	 (ROE).	 The	 EBA’s	 definition	 of	 the	 ROA	 and	 ROE	 uses	 net	 profit	 after	 tax	 in	 the	
numerators and, for the denominators, the average of the current and the preceding year’s total 
assets (ROA) and total equity (ROE). As a result, there may be small differences between them. 
However,	international	comparisons	use	the	EBA’s	definition	(Chart	2.13),	to	ensure	that	the	ratios	
are calculated in the same way across jurisdictions.
The fall in ROA between June 2018 and June 2019 was broad-based across institutions. Most institutions posted year-on-year growth in ATA, 
although for a large number this did not translate into an increase in profit, or the increase was insufficient to maintain the return on assets.
PROFITABILITY DISTRIBUTION
Consolidated data
Chart 2.10
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The chart shows the density function (or frequency distribution) of the return on assets for Spanish deposit institutions, weighted by average total 
assets. This density function is approximated using a kernel estimator, which makes possible a non-parametric estimation of the density function, 
providing a continuous, smoothed graphic representation of this function.
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institutions. In addition, impairment losses, which had been falling uninterruptedly 
since 2013, rose by 3.9%. Meanwhile, net interest income posted an increase of 
close to 3%, while net fees and commissions remained relatively steady. 
In	business	in	Spain,	operating	expenses	have	remained	flat	since	late	2013. 
As a result, the efficiency ratio and the ratio of operating expenses to total assets 
have deteriorated at most institutions. Specifically, Chart 2.12 shows that the 
efficiency ratio at the individual level, without taking into account compensation for 
dismissals, has increased (worsened) by around nine percentage points since 2014, 
to stand at 56.2%. The ratio of operating expenses to total assets has also increased 
at most institutions. As regards its composition, Chart 2.12 shows that the weight of 
personnel costs has fallen while that of IT and communications, outsourced services 
and depreciation has increased, reflecting to some extent the digitalisation and 
technological transformation being undertaken by institutions. Operating expenses 
are one of the most important levers that institutions can directly control in order to 
increase the profitability of their business.
In	June	2019,	Spanish	 institutions	continue	to	post	consolidated	profitability	
above the European average. EBA data for June 2019 (the latest published),10 show 
that Spain is above major European jurisdictions (see Chart 2.13), with the exception 
10 See https://eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/risk-dashboard.
The fall in net gains on financial assets and liabilities, the increase in operating expenses and the increase in impairment losses were the main 
determinants of the fall in profit in the first half of 2019. Impairment losses increased after six years of continuous decline.
COMPONENTS OF PROFITABILITY
Consolidated data
Chart 2.11
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The red (green) colour of the bars indicates a negative (positive) contribution of the corresponding item to the change in consolidated profit in June 
2019 with respect to June 2018.
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of Italy. The efficiency ratio at consolidated level of the Spanish institutions was among 
the lowest (best) in Europe. Box 1.2 analyses in detail the impact of the new monetary 
policy measures announced by the ECB in September 2019 on the net interest income 
of deposit institutions, beyond the moderate positive impact associated with the two 
tier system of ECB deposit facility rates. An analysis of the comparative profitability of 
European and US banks and how this is valued by the market can be found in Box 2.1.
The cost-to-income ratio (excluding compensation for dismissal) at the individual deposit institution level for business in Spain has increased 
(deteriorated) since 2014. This increase has been accompanied by a higher ratio of operating expenses to total assets for deposit 
institutions. During these years the weights of IT and communication costs, outsourced services and depreciation in total operating 
expenses have increased, while the weight of personnel costs has fallen.
OPERATING EXPENSES AND COST-TO-INCOME RATIO
Business in Spain, ID
Chart 2.12
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The cost-to-income ratio is defined as the ratio of operationg expenses to gross income. The June 2019 data have been annualised.
b This panel shows the density function (or frequency distribution) of operating expenses as a percentage of total assets for deposit institutions. This 
density function is approximated using a kernel estimator, which makes possible a non-parametric estimation of the density function, providing a 
continuous, smoothed graphic representation of this function.
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Solvency
The	 ratio	 that	 measures	 the	 highest	 quality	 capital,	 common	 equity	 Tier	 1	
(CET1),	increased	by	36	bp	over	the	12	months	to	June	2019,	to	stand	at	12.2%. 
Similarly, the Tier-1 and total capital ratios rose by 37 and 32 bp,11 to stand at 13.6% 
and 15.4%, respectively (see Chart 2.14). This improvement in institutions’ solvency 
occurred in a context of rising risk-weighted assets (1.1% year-on-year), and despite 
the negative impact of the introduction of IFRS 16 on criteria for the recognition, 
11  The fully-loaded CET1 ratio stood at 11.9% in June 2019, having increased by 0.5 pp since June 
2018. As the Basel III regime had been almost completely implemented by June 2019, the difference 
between the CET1 ratio (applying the phase-in schedule laid down by the regulation) and its fully 
loaded version (applying the rules in force at the end of the implementation period) is small.
The return on assets of the main Spanish deposit institutions stands above the European average (0.47%) and is higher than in the main EU 
economies. Their cost-to-income ratio, meanwhile, is among the lowest (best) in the EU, standing slightly above 50%.
EUROPEAN COMPARISON OF PROFITABILITY AND EFFICIENCY MEASURES
SSM COUNTRIES AND UNITED KINGDOM. June 2019
Consolidated data
Chart 2.13
SOURCE: EBA.
a The cost-to-income ratio is defined as the ratio of operating expenses and depreciation to net operating income.
b EBA data include Iceland.
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valuation and presentation of lease agreements which is estimated as –9 bp of CET1 
on average in the sector.
The	 two	 largest	 institutions	 in	 the	 Spanish	 banking	 system	 were	 mainly	
responsible	for	the	improvement	in	the	CET1	ratio. It can be seen in Chart 2.15 
how, over the past year, more institutions increased their CET1 ratio than reduced it, 
although the difference is not large. As regards the composition of the CET1, capital 
and reserves account for more than 90% of the eligible items. Indeed, the increase 
in reserves, explains most of the recorded increase in solvency. Minority interests 
represent 6%, while transitional adjustments, as a consequence of the practically 
complete implementation of the CRR/CRD IV, have a weight of only 2%. Most of the 
deductions correspond to goodwill and other intangible assets (see Chart 2.15).
Notwithstanding	these	developments,	in	June	2019	Spanish	institutions	had,	on	
average,	lower	levels	of	solvency	relative	to	other	European	countries.	Chart 2.16 
presents a Europe-wide comparison of two solvency measures, the CET1 ratio (panel 1) 
and the leverage ratio (panel 2), based on the latest data published by the EBA.12 Spanish 
institutions have a CET1 ratio almost 3 pp below the European average, although above 
the regulatory minimum requirement. As regards the leverage ratio, Spain was 
above the largest European jurisdictions, but still in the lower half of the ranking.
12 See https://eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/risk-dashboard.
Between June 2018 and June 2019, the CET1 ratio increased by 36 bp to stand at 12.2%, while the Tier 1 and total capital ratios increased 
by similar magnitudes. Risk weighted assets grew by 1.1% over the same period.
CAPITAL AND RISK WEIGHTED ASSETS
Consolidated data
Chart 2.14
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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One	reason	why	the	CET1	ratio	of	Spanish	institutions	is	lower	than	that	of	their	
European	 peers	 is	 the	 greater	 use	 by	 Spanish	 banks	 of	 the	 standardised	
approach	(SA)	to	calculate	their	capital	requirements.	Under the SA, institutions 
that do not apply their own internal models (IRB) all use the same risk weights for the 
different portfolios which are generally higher than those in IRB models. Previous 
editions of the FSR have explained in detail how, in comparison with the use of internal 
models, use of the SA is associated with a higher risk-weighted assets (RWAs) 
density.13, 14
On	the	other	hand,	there	do	not	appear	to	be	significant	differences	between	
Spanish	banks	and	those	of	other	European	countries	as	regards	the	densities	
obtained using IRB models. The average RWA density in IRB portfolios can be 
compared for the institutions of the main European banking sectors that participated 
in the transparency exercise published by the EBA in 2018 using the data obtained in 
that exercise (to June 2018). The Spanish institutions that use internal IRB models to 
manage credit risk are distributed relatively homogenously among the European 
institutions in terms of RWA density (see Chart 2.17). In short, the analysis of densities 
13 See FSR of May 2018 and FSR of May 2017. 
14	 	The	RWA	density	of	a	portfolio	is	defined	as	the	ratio	of	the	volume	of	risk-weighted	assets	to	the	
gross volume of such assets (without applying risk weights).
In terms of institutions, although there is no great difference, the number of those whose CET1 ratio increased over the past year is greater 
than the number of those whose ratio declined. The main components of the CET1 are capital instruments and reserves, which represent 
more than 90% of their eligible items.
CHANGE AND COMPOSITION OF THE CET1 CAPITAL RATIO
Consolidated data
Chart 2.15
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The points above the bisector show growth (declines) in the volume of CET1 over the past year higher (lower) than the growth (decline) in the volume 
of RWAs; accordingly, they would correspond to increases in the CET1 ratio between June 2018 and June 2019. The opposite occurs for points 
below the bisector.
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in the private sector credit portfolio of institutions that use IRB models does not help 
to explain the relative position of Spanish institutions in the European solvency ranking.
The	Basel	III	framework	reform	agreed	in	2017	introduces	restrictions	on	IRB	
models,	 in	 particular	 an	 output	 floor	 to	 capital	 requirements.	 Among other 
important measures, the Basel III reform introduces restrictions on the models used 
by institutions to value the risks they incur (limits on their use and on the parameters 
estimated in the method based on internal credit risk ratings), improvements to the 
risk sensitivity of the standardised approach for credit risk and, in particular, an 
output floor. This quantification of risk is a key element in determining RWAs, which 
are the basis for calculating institutions’ capital requirements. 
The	aim	of	the	output	floor	is	to	place	a	limit	on	the	benefits	a	bank	can	obtain	
by	using	IRB	models,	so	that	its	impact	is	greater	in	jurisdictions	where	this	
The CET1 ratio for the main Spanish deposit institutions is in last place, while their leverage ratio stands slightly above the European average, 
and above the main EU countries.
EUROPEAN COMPARISON OF SOLVENCY MEASURES
SSM COUNTRIES AND UNITED KINGDOM. June 2019
Consolidated data
Chart 2.16
SOURCE: EBA.
a EBA data include Iceland.
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type	of	model	is	used	more	intensively.	 It should be noted that the new output 
floor replaces the existing Basel II floor with a more robust, risk-sensitive floor, based 
on the revised Basel III standardised approaches. Thus, the output floor attempts 
to place a limit on the benefit a bank can obtain by using internal models to calculate 
its minimum capital requirements, helping to improve the comparability, credibility 
and transparency of the capital ratios and in short, to help ensure a level playing field 
for banks, in terms of the calculation of capital requirements.
Analysis	of	the	reforms	shows	that	the	greater	impact	in	Europe	stems	from	
the	output	floor	to	capital	requirements	 (see Chart 2.18). In order to assess the 
impact of these measures on banks’ capital requirements, the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the EBA have both performed quantitative impact 
studies (QISs) of the new prudential regulations. The latest regular monitoring report 
of the BCBS presents these aggregate impacts for internationally active banks in 
three geographical areas: Europe, the Americas and the rest of the world. 
The	 largest	 impacts	 of	 the	 floor	 to	 capital	 requirements	 for	 the	 sample	 of	
countries	 and	 banks	 used,	 are	 concentrated	 in	 Sweden,	 Denmark	 and	
Germany,	according	to	the	July	2019	EBA	report.15 Other countries in which the 
15  Report in response to the request for advise issued by the European Commission in which the 
impact of the Basel III reforms is studied.
The density of the RWAs in IRB portfolios is highly heterogeneous, both among the main banking sectors of the EU and at the level of the 
institutions that use internal models for credit risk management. Spanish institutions that use IRB models are distributed relatively uniformly 
across the various RWA density ranges.
EUROPEAN COMPARISON OF RWA DENSITY IN THE IRB PORTFOLIO (a)
MAIN SSM COUNTRIES AND UNITED KINGDOM. June 2018
Consolidated data
Chart 2.17
SOURCE: EBA.
a Weighted density of the main credit portfolios (businesses, retail and secured by real estate) of the institutions participating in the EBA's transparency 
exercise that use advanced IRB models for credit risk management.
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floor to requirements accounts for a significant proportion of the impact of the Basel 
III reform are Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, France and Belgium. Such impacts 
tend to be concentrated among a relatively small set of banks where the difference 
between the capital calculations under internal models and those resulting from the 
application of the standardised approach is greatest. These estimated impacts may 
be smaller, since they assume that institutions keep other capital buffers that they 
currently have unchanged, e.g. Pillar 2 capital requirements (P2R and P2G), combined 
requirements and voluntary buffers. 
2.1.3  Forward-looking assessment of the Spanish banking system’s 
resilience
The	 methodology	 used	 for	 the	 Banco	 de	 España’s	 stress	 tests,	 known	 
by	the	acronym	FLESB	(Forward	Looking	Exercise	on	Spanish	Banks),	was	
applied	 to	 the	2019-2021	horizon	 to	measure	Spanish	banks’	 resilience	 in	
terms	of	solvency	and	liquidity. The Banco de España designed FLESB using 
a top-down approach, under which a set of models developed internally are 
applied to the information available from regulatory and supervisory reports.16 
16  The bottom-up methodology is an alternative approach to banking sector stress tests in which the 
banks themselves make the estimates applying their own models and databases. The EBA’s biennial 
stress test uses a constrained bottom-up approach, under which banks apply a bottom-up 
approach that is partially restricted by the methodological guidelines set by the EBA. 
Analysis of the impact of the Basel III framework reform shows that the greatest impact in Europe arises from the output floor, which is 
designed to limit the benefits that a bank can obtain by using IRB models, to ensure a level playing field for all banks.
IMPACTS ON MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OF THE APPLICATION OF BASEL III
Change to current requirements (a)
Chart 2.18
SOURCE: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
a The length and direction of each arrow indicate the size and sign of the relative change in the capital requirements as a consequence of the impact of 
Basel III on the corresponding items indicated on the horizontal axis. The point of each arrow indicates the relative change resulting from accumulation 
of the impacts of Basel III on the corresponding item on the horizontal axis, and on all the items to the left of the latter.
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Among other developments, a more comprehensive analysis of sovereign exposures 
has been incorporated this year.
The	 baseline	 scenario	 for	 the	 solvency	 exercise	 consists	 of	 the	 Banco	 de	
España’s	macroeconomic	projections	published	in	2019	H1. Under the adverse 
scenario there is a downturn in economic activity and a correction of the value of 
financial assets in line with the identification of risks in this FSR. It should be borne 
in mind that the adverse scenario does not reflect Spanish authorities’ economic 
expectations. Rather, it is based on hypothetical assumptions for assessing 
the banking sector’s resilience. In other words, it is a highly unlikely scenario. 
Likewise, it is important to note that the Banco de España’s latest projection exercise 
revised growth forecasts downwards and, therefore, the baseline scenario used in 
the exercise is slightly optimistic. Lastly, these scenarios are global in scope, as they 
include projections not only for the Spanish economy, but also for the countries that 
are relevant for Spanish banks.
The	baseline	scenario	assumes	a	moderate	slowdown	in	GDP	in	the	period	2019-
2021	and	the	adverse	scenario	considers	a	recession	in	2019-2020.	Specifically, 
under the baseline scenario GDP would accumulate growth of 5.9% in three years, 
against a 1.7% decline under the adverse scenario (see Chart 2.19). This is a difference 
of 7.6 pp, which is stricter in terms of severity than the 7.4 pp difference in the 2018 
FLESB exercise, whose scenarios were the same as those applied in the EU-wide 
stress test conducted by the EBA. The changes in the unemployment rate and in house 
prices under the scenarios are consistent with this behaviour of GDP. Thus, the 
unemployment rate drops to 12.3% under the baseline scenario, but rises to 16.5% 
under the adverse scenario. House prices decrease by 15.5% under the adverse 
scenario, against cumulative growth of 14.4% under the baseline scenario. Finally, the 
3-month interbank interest rate exhibits a 70 bp difference between the baseline and 
adverse scenarios for 2021, reflecting the widespread increase in interest rates17 which 
would result from materialisation of the risk of a rise in risk premia, and also entailing a 
decline in the value of fixed-income and equity instruments. 
For	 the	 liquidity	 analysis,	 the	 scenarios	 are	 defined	 in	 terms	 of	 fund	 outflow	
coefficients	applied	to	the	liquidity	coverage	ratio	(LCR). Specifically, the baseline 
scenario uses the regulatory coefficients for 30-day fund outflows set by the BCBS and 
the EBA. The Banco de España defines the adverse scenario by introducing additional 
stress in these coefficients, based on past experience in Spain.18 The reference date is 
December 2018. 
17  In these types of exercises, it is assumed that economic policies, particularly monetary policy, do not 
react.
18	 	The	 same	 fund	 outflow	 coefficients	 that	 were	 considered	 last	 year	 were	 used	 for	 the	 adverse	
scenario. See FSR, Banco de España, November 2018, page 74.
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Results yielded by the FLESB methodology. Solvency
The	57	banks	taking	part	in	the	exercise	are	divided	into	three	groups	based	
on	supervisory	scope	and	international	activity.	The first group consists of the 
Spanish banks under the direct supervision of the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(SSM) with significant international activity, the second group consists of the other 
significant Spanish banks under direct SSM supervision and the third group 
comprises other banks. The banks in the third group are smaller, less complex, 
supervised directly by the Banco de España and do not engage in significant 
international activity.19 This segmentation, which reflects the differences in banks’ 
19 For further information see FSR, Banco de España, November 2018, page 76.
The difference in the nature of the scenarios is reflected in the changes in the macro variables that define them. The baseline scenario 
assumes a growth path with a slight slowdown and a small rise in the interest rate. By contrast, under the adverse scenario there is a 
pronounced contraction of activity accompanied by a significant increase in the interest rate.
MACROECONOMIC SCENARIOS
Chart 2.19
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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business models and sources of risk, coincides with that used in the FLESB 
exercises of previous years. 
The	 group	 of	 banks	 supervised	 by	 the	 SSM	 with	 significant	 international	
activity20	shows	a	1.2 pp	improvement	in	their	CET1	ratio	under	the	baseline	
scenario	and	a	0.4 pp	fall	under	 the	adverse	scenario. Chart 2.20 shows the 
results for the first group of banks. In this case, estimates of the performance of 
business outside Spain are also incorporated in the impact on solvency. As can be 
seen, the gross losses in Spain under the baseline scenario (4.2% of RWAs) are 
absorbed by the use of existing provisions (2.7% of RWAs) and by profit generation 
(5.2% of RWAs). The other impacts have a negative effect on the solvency ratio 
(2.5%), due to loan growth, which flows through to higher RWAs, and to the effect 
of taxes and profit distributions. The severity of the macroeconomic conditions 
under the adverse scenario prompts greater losses (6.6%), which cannot be fully 
absorbed by use of existing provisions (2.7%) or by profit generation (3.3%), so 
solvency decreases. Note that, under this scenario, the other impacts have a slightly 
positive contribution (0.1%), since loans diminish and the tax burden and distributions 
decrease largely owing to the absence of profits.
For	the	other	banks	supervised	by	the	SSM,	the	baseline	scenario	produces	
an	improvement	of	0.7	pp	in	the	CET1	ratio	and	the	adverse	scenario	prompts	
a	 fall	of	2.7	pp. Chart 2.21 shows that this group starts from a more favourable 
20 See FSR, Banco de España, November 2017, footnote 7 of Chapter 2.
Banks with significant international exposure maintain a solid level of solvency even at the end of the adverse scenario. To this contributes a 
contained volume of losses and robust profit generation, both of which are favoured by geographical diversification.
IMPACT ON CET1 FL RATIO
INSTITUTIONS WITH SIGNIFICANT INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY
Chart 2.20
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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solvency position than banks with significant international activity, since its initial 
CET1 ratio is 12.3%. However, it evolves less favourably during the year both under 
the baseline scenario, where the CET1 ratio rises by 0.7 pp in 2020 (compared with 
1.2 pp for the first group), and under the adverse scenario, where it falls by 2.7 pp 
(compared with 0.4 pp). Under the adverse scenario, there is a highly significant 
increase in the volume of losses (12.5% of RWAs), such that the available loss 
absorbing elements are clearly insufficient to cover them by the use of provisions 
(5.4% of RWAs) and by profit generation (4.3% of RWAs). This weaker relative 
performance is because these banks do not benefit from the international 
diversification of the first group, which proved to be a robust source of profit 
generation during the past crisis. The concentration of their business in Spain, 
where the adverse scenario envisages a notable fall in economic activity and in real 
estate prices, has a significant impact on them through their exposures to credit risk 
and to foreclosed assets.
The banks under direct national supervision21	increase	their	CET1	ratio	by	1	
pp	under	the	baseline	scenario,	while	under	the	adverse	scenario	it	falls	by	
0.6	pp.	These banks perform more strongly than those of the previous group despite 
the fact that their operations are also concentrated in Spain, because are less 
exposed to credit risk and to the real estate sector. Chart 2.22 shows that under 
21	 	This	 FSR	 considers	 a	 sample	 of	 45	 LSIs	 (less	 significant	 institutions,	 according	 to	 the	 SSM’s	
supervisory	 classification),	which	 includes	 the	 savings	banks	and	credit	 cooperatives	along	with	
other	less	significant	institutions	(OLSIs).
Despite a significant increase in losses under the adverse scenario, mainly owing to greater exposure to real estate risk, other SSM 
institutions adequately contend with this scenario and maintain at the end of the year a CET1 ratio above the minimum thresholds required.
IMPACT ON CET1 FL RATIO
OTHER SSM INSTITUTIONS
Chart 2.21
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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the adverse scenario the volume of losses (9.7% of RWAs) exceeds that of the 
instruments which can absorb them, namely provisions (5.6%) and profit generation 
(3.3%), with a positive contribution (0.2%) from other impacts. The final CET1 ratio at 
the end of the exercise is 16.5%, the highest of the three groups, influenced by an initial 
CET1 ratio of 17.1%.  
Consequently,	 at	 aggregate	 level	 the	 Spanish	 deposit	 institutions	 in	 the	
aforementioned	three	groups	have	an	adequate	solvency	position	in	the	event	
of	materialisation	of	the	risks	identified	under	the	adverse	scenario.	Compared 
with the previous year’s exercise, there is a lower impact under the adverse scenario, 
despite it being slightly more severe. This is mainly due to the lower losses, made 
possible by the improved credit quality of the assets and the lower exposure to real 
estate risk. It should, however, be noted that the aggregate profit generation of all 
the groups is slightly lower than a year earlier, evidencing the tight profit environment 
in which Spanish banks are currently operating.  
Despite	 these	 results,	 banks	 must	 not	 relax	 in	 their	 efforts	 to	 raise	 their	
solvency	 level. It should be taken into account that there is a certain degree of 
heterogeneity among the banks comprising each group. Also, there is a possibility 
that a bank may undergo an idiosyncratic shock additional to the systemic shock 
envisaged under the adverse scenario, and a chance that the risk may materialise in 
an economic downturn even more severe than that considered here. Indeed, the 
current macroeconomic projections of the Banco de España are somewhat more 
pessimistic than the baseline scenario used for the FLESB exercise. Stress tests 
The group of banks under direct national supervision maintains a very high level of solvency under the adverse scenario. A more conservative 
profile contributes to this, translating into a less significant volume of losses than that observed for the other SSM banks, albeit with 
comparatively lower profit generation.
IMPACT ON CET1 FL RATIO
LESS SIGNIFICANT INSTITUTIONS
Chart 2.22
SOURCE: Banco de España.
17.1%
5.0%
4.2% 6.7%
1.5% 18.1%
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
CET1 2018 Provisions
used
 (% RWAs
2018)
Losses
 (% RWAs
 2018)
Other
impacts
CET1 2021
1  BASELINE SCENARIO
%
17.1%
5.6%
3.3% 9.7%
0.2% 16.5%
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
CET1 2018 Provisions
used
 (% RWAs
2018)
Losses
 (% RWAs
 2018)
Other
impacts
CET1 2021
2  ADVERSE SCENARIO
%
Profit
generation 
(% RWAs
2018)
Profit
generation 
(% RWAs
2018)
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 77 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, AUTUMN 2019  2 RISKS TO THE FINANCIAL SECTOR AND ITS RESILIENCE
supplement, but cannot replace, other risk analysis tools of the Banco de España, 
including most notably the microprudential supervision of deposit institutions. All this 
advises that banks pursue a prudent, responsible policy of strengthening their capital 
insofar as the profits generated in a favourable macroeconomic setting so allow.
Sensitivity analyses. Sovereign exposures
Based	 on	 this	 stress	 test,	 a	 complementary	 sensitivity	 analysis	 was	
conducted. Its purpose was to assess how the solvency test results are affected by 
the accounting classification of the sovereign debt portfolio, i.e. by their treatment as 
exposures at amortised cost or at fair value.
The	 sovereign	 debt	 held	 by	 banks	may	 be	 accounted	 for	 at	 fair	 value	 or	 at	
amortised cost. In the first case, the changes in its market value are taken immediately 
to the bank’s P/L or equity. By contrast, in the second case the valuation of the 
securities on the balance sheet is not subject to continual review, since the bank 
intends to hold them to maturity. This is extremely important for stress tests when 
one of the risks crystallising under the adverse scenario is a decrease in the value of 
these assets. Hence, this sensitivity test reproduces the results of the exercise under 
the assumption that all the sovereign exposure is classified at fair value.  
Banks under direct national supervision are, by far, the ones most sensitive to the accounting classification of sovereign exposure. They are 
followed by the other SSM banks and, lastly, by banks with significant international activity. This greater sensitivity is the result of the greater 
weight of sovereign exposures in total assets, as well as the greater weight of exposures recognised at amortised cost.
ANALYSIS OF SENSITIVITY TO THE ACCOUNTING CLASSIFICATION OF SOVEREIGN EXPOSURES
Chart 2.23
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The percentage of sovereign exposure that is recognised at amortised cost (i.e. not recognised at fair value) and the ratio of sovereign exposure 
to total assets are shown for each group of banks as at December 2018.
b The additional consumption in pp of the CET1 ratio that would result under the adverse scenario if the sovereign exposure recognised at amortised 
cost were re-classified at fair value is shown for each group of banks for the period 2019-2021.
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If	 all	 the	sovereign	exposure	were	measured	at	 fair	 value,	 there	would	be	a	
general decrease in the CET1 ratio under the adverse scenario. Specifically, 
Chart 2.23 shows an additional decrease of 1 pp in the CET1 ratio of the banks with 
international operations, of 1.5 pp in the other SSM banks and of 2.8 pp in those 
under direct national supervision. The extent of the additional impacts depends on 
two factors. First, the relative weight of the sovereign exposure in total assets 
(13.7%, 15.8% and 27.4%, respectively). Second, the relative weight of the portfolios 
measured at amortised cost in the total sovereign exposure (42.9%, 63.9% and 
68.3%, respectively). It is these exposures measured at amortised cost which are 
affected by the sensitivity analysis when they are reclassified to the fair value portfolio.
Results yielded by the FLESB methodology. Liquidity 
The	 aggregate	 LCR	 for	 each	 group	 of	 banks	 stands	 above	 the	 minimum	
requirement	 (100%)	under	 the	adverse	scenario.	As also occurred last year, the 
liquidity position of the less significant institutions was particularly notable, since, even 
under the adverse scenario, they had a ratio of 355% (see Chart 2.24). In general, this 
was due to the substantial portfolio of low-return but high-liquidity assets held by them.
2.1.4 Changes in operational risks
Operational	risk	represents	9.3%	of	the	volume	of	RWAs	of	Spanish	deposit	
institutions. In June 2018, the Spanish banking sector was ranked fourth by volume 
The ample liquidity starting point of all the groups of banks allows them to maintain a LCR above the minimum threshold of 100% under the 
adverse scenario, for which fund outflow coefficients that are even more stringent than those defined in the original rules are applied.
IMPACT ON THE LCR
Chart 2.24
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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of RWAs linked to operational risk (€134  billion) according to the data of the 
EBA’s latest transparency exercise (Chart 2.25). The operational risk of Spanish 
banks stands at 9.3%, relative to total RWAs, which is lower than the European 
average (10.5%) and that of the largest countries. The deterioration of solvency 
associated with an operational risk event may be high according to historical 
experience. Indeed, for European banks affected by the largest operational 
events, it has held at above 1.25 pp of CET1 over the last five years and rose to 
2.1 pp in 2018.
The	potential	materialisation	of	costs	associated	with	legal	risks	continues	to	
contribute	to	the	operational	risk	of	Spanish	deposit	institutions.	Proceedings 
linked to past lawsuits such as those on floor clauses, with an estimated cost of 
more than €2.2 billion for the sector until June 2019, have already taken place, but 
there is a possibility of further litigation. For instance, in 2018 credit card-related 
claims filed with the Banco de España increased considerably, as did litigation on 
the terms and conditions of revolving credit agreements, in particular, regarding 
deferred payment cards. This suggests a potential increase in litigation in this 
segment of the banking business. 
Operational risk-related RWAs at European level stood below 15% of total RWAs in June 2018. Spain was ranked fourth by volume of RWAs, 
although operational risk-related RWAs as a proportion of total RWAs stood at 9.3 %, which is lower than the European average (10.5%), 
and that of the largest European countries. The five highest operational risk losses recorded in Europe, as a percentage of CET1, remained 
relatively stable between 2014 and 2017 (between 1.2% and 1.5%), albeit rising substantially in 2018 (2.1%).
OPERATIONAL RISK
MAIN SSM COUNTRIES AND UNITED KINGDOM
Consolidated data
Chart 2.25
SOURCE: EBA.
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The CJEU has still not issued a ruling on the question of the use of the mortgage 
loan reference index (IRPH by its Spanish abbreviation) as a benchmark in 
variable-rate mortgage loan agreements. As a prior step to the ruling, the 
Advocate General’s conclusions on this matter were published on 10 September, 
however, they do not determine the CJEU’s final ruling.
Other operational risks indicated in the previous FSR in relation to Brexit 
and to the changeover in European settlement systems and benchmark 
indices are still present. The Brexit process continues to raise issues about the 
operations of Central Counterparties (CCPs) which were considered in Box 1.1. 
The consolidation of TARGET2 and TARGET2-Securities planned for 2021 
continues to pose a technological challenge and the transition from EONIA to 
€STR should be completed in 2020.
The reform of the Euribor introduces methodological improvements to make 
it more robust and to have it properly reflect financing conditions in the 
interbank market. Under the European Union Benchmarks Regulation, 
compulsory conditions affecting the Euribor are imposed so that it can be used in 
financial instruments and contracts after 31 December 2021. In this respect, the 
reform of the Euribor towards a hybrid methodology22 developed by EMMI, its 
administrator, was authorised last July by the Belgian authority, FSMA; accordingly, 
it may be used from 1 January 2020 in new and existing contracts and instruments. 
As a result, the gradual implementation of the new methodology will have to be 
concluded in the course of 2019 Q4.
Euribor indices are based on the voluntary contribution of a panel of banks. 
In this respect, one potential risk would be if a significant number of institutions 
decided to refrain from participating. To cover for that eventuality, Article 28 of the 
Regulation requires banks that use any benchmark index to have detailed plans 
on the measures to be taken if the benchmark index should cease to be provided, 
indicating one or several alternative indices. For this reason, a working group 
comprising representatives of large European banks is addressing the transition 
from EONIA, which is scheduled to be phased out by January 2022, to the €STR 
and for the introduction of reserve indices for all the indices used.23 
Lastly, the growing importance of risks related to cybersecurity for the 
financial sector needs to be underlined in this area. Technological innovation 
and the changes in the expectations of customers who expect tailored products 
22  According to this methodology, the 18 banks which contribute to the panel will supply information 
in the following order: i) use of data on transactions, ii) performance of estimations if sufficient data 
are not available, iii) use of other market data.
23  On 14 March 2019 the WG-RFR published its recommendation for a methodology based on OIS 
quotes to set up an €STR-based rate structure as an alternative to Euribor-linked contracts.
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and continuous multi-channel availability of new services have compelled financial 
institutions to develop their technological systems. This has frequently compelled 
them to adopt technologies which have not been tested sufficiently and to become 
increasingly reliant on services provided by third parties, which blurs the perimeter 
of the organisation that needs to be protected. Furthermore, the concentration of 
cloud-based services in the hands of a small number of unregulated, unsupervised 
suppliers is increasing and they are becoming critical points in financial 
infrastructure.
The costs associated with the materialisation of cyber risks include both 
the direct economic impact and indirect damage associated with a loss of 
confidence and the interconnections between institutions. Direct economic 
loss, as a result of the materialisation of these cyber risks, would be associated 
with institutions’ incapacity to provide services to their customers or failure to 
meet their contractual and legal obligations with the subsequent impact on 
reputation and increase in litigation. Preventing these incidents also entails 
increased spending on infrastructure and the need to have skilled employees. If 
the high level of interconnectedness between the various industry participants 
is considered, cyber risks may ultimately affect the stability of the system as 
a whole.
A set of European rules geared towards preventing and mitigating cyber risks 
already exists, although it is somewhat fragmented and, thus, potentially less 
effective when applied. The set of rules includes the Directive on the Protection of 
Critical Infrastructures, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the Network 
Information Security Directive (NISD) and the Revised Payment Service Directive 
(PSD2). 
As a result of the multiple rules on cyber risks, financial institutions have to 
notify numerous authorities about cybersecurity incidents. Specifically, if an 
incident of this type were to affect a Spanish institution deemed to be a critical 
infrastructure and were to have an impact on the payment users’ personal data, 
the institution would have to notify the following national and European authorities: 
i) by virtue of the NISD, the National Institute of Cybersecurity Response Centre 
(INCIBE-CERT by its Spanish abbreviation) (Ministry of the Economy and 
Enterprise) must be notified and since it is a critical infrastructure, the National 
Centre for the Protection of Critical Infrastructures (CNPIC by its Spanish 
abbreviation) (Ministry of the Interior) would take control; ii) under the PSD2 and 
GDPR rules, respectively, the institution would have to inform the Banco de 
España and the Spanish Data Protection Agency; iii) according to banking 
supervision regulations the SSM would have to be notified, if the institution is 
significant. These notification obligations have different time frames and involve 
sending different forms, which increases the risk of a lack of coordination and the 
administrative workload related to the incident.
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2.2  Non-banking financial sector and systemic interconnections
2.2.1 Non-banking financial sector 
The non-banking financial sector analysed in this section has shown a 
more expansionary profile in recent years. In the low-interest rate setting 
prevailing in recent years, the performance of the specialised lending institutions, 
insurance companies, investment funds and pensions funds analysed in this 
subsection, generally shows an increase in activity with broadly positive 
profitability levels.
Specialised lending institutions
Specialised lending institutions (SLIs) concentrate specifically on granting 
credit and cannot take deposits from the general public. They are particularly 
significant in the consumer credit segment which accounts for around 50% of their 
total portfolio. Many SLIs, representing 80% of these institutions’ total lending, are 
part of national banking groups. At aggregate level they represent 4% of lending to 
the private sector and 23% of consumer credit.
Over recent years, in contrast with the decline observed in deposit institutions, 
the credit granted by SLIs has grown steadily at year-on-year rates that have 
held at around 10%. For instance, in June 2019 total lending to the resident private 
sector grew by 11% compared with June 2018 and quickened slightly with respect 
to previous quarters (Chart 2.26).
Having posted significant declines, these institutions’ non-performing loans 
are now showing positive year-on-year changes. This is the result of SLIs 
specialising in riskier business segments such as consumer loans. However, the non-
performing loans ratio remains contained for the moment, owing to the robust increases 
in the ratio’s denominator (credit).
These institutions’ profitability is substantially higher than that of deposit-
taking institutions’ business in Spain. The income statements of SLIs have 
remained stable in recent years, of note are the weight of net interest income and the 
growth of fee and commission income, which have offset the considerable rise in 
impairment losses in recent quarters.
Insurance companies
The main insurance companies in Spain have increased their assets in recent 
years, whereas their return on investment has held relatively stable. 
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Over recent years, in contrast with deposit institutions, the credit granted by SLIs has grown steadily at year-on-year rates that have held at 
around 10%. Non-performing loans declined considerably and then posted positive year-on-year changes.
SPECIALISED LENDING INSTITUTIONS
Business in Spain. ID
Chart 2.26
SOURCE: Banco de España.
NET INTEREST INCOME
FEES AND OTHER NET FINANCIAL INCOME
OPERATING EXPENSES
IMPAIRMENT LOSSES
PROVISIONS, TAXES AND OTHER INCOME
ROA
2  INCOME STATEMENT
% of total assets
0
5
10
15
20
25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
Jun-15 Dec-15 Jun-16 Dec-16 Jun-17 Dec-17 Jun-18 Dec-18 Jun-19
TOTAL NPL RATIO (right-hand scale)
TOTAL LENDING
TOTAL NON-PERFORMING LOANS
% %
1  LENDING AND NON-PERFORMING LOANS OF RESIDENT PRIVATE SECTOR
    Rate of change and NPL ratio 
%
Jun-15 Jun-19
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
In Spain, the insurance sector’s volume of assets has increased in recent years. The sector’s solvency has remained relatively stable, 
whereas the return on assets held at above 2%.
INSURANCE COMPANIES
Consolidated data
Chart 2.27
SOURCE: SNL Financial and information published by entities.
a Liquidity is defined as the ratio of cash and liquid deposits to total liabilities.
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Since 2015, the insurance sector’s24 volume of assets has grown constantly and to a 
greater extent than the assets consolidated in the balance sheets of banks and, 
consequently, the latter’s significance in this sector has declined (Chart 2.27). This 
greater size was not accompanied by an improvement in the sector’s liquidity, which 
has fallen. Solvency levels have remained stable.25 Finally, the sector’s return on 
assets (ROA), which dipped somewhat last year, remains above 2%, whereas ROE 
slightly exceeded 15% last year, which is considerably higher than the banking 
sector’s profitability ratios.
Investment funds
In the year to date, investment funds’ assets have increased slightly as a result 
of positive returns. Since the second half of 2018, net subscriptions of investment 
funds, which had grown since 2013, have remained flat or declined slightly. In 2019, 
as a result of the positive returns in six of the first eight months of the year, investment 
funds’ net assets have increased by 4.3% (Chart 2.28).
24  The information analysed here, which is drawn from SNL Financial’s database, relates to Spain’s 
main insurance companies, which represent approximately 84% of the insurance sector’s assets.
25  The decrease in the solvency ratio in 2016 is due to the change in regulation associated to the 
implementation of the Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
November 2009.
In the year to date, investment funds’ net asset values have increased slightly as a result of positive returns, since net subscriptions have 
remained flat.
INVESTMENT FUNDS
Chart 2.28
SOURCES: Inverco and CNMV.
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Pension funds
Also in this case, it is the pick-up in returns which explains the increase in 
pension funds’ assets in 2019. Pension funds’ assets stood at historical highs 
(Chart 2.29). Net contributions to pension funds (adjusted for the value of benefits) 
have shown negative values since end-2018 (–0.2% of net assets at end-2018), and 
a clearly decreasing pattern over time. However, these funds’ assets climbed steadily 
during 2019 (1.6% in year-on-year terms) due to a higher contribution from profitability.
2.2.2 Systemic interconnections
This FSR analyses the direct interconnections of the resident financial system 
with non-resident financial institutions and examines indirect interconnections 
through exposures to marketable securities.26 Direct interconnections between 
resident financial sectors and changes in them in recent years, shown in the 2019 
Spring FSR, have remained stable. Their analysis is not updated in this issue.
26  Direct interconnections refer to financial instruments issued by a financial institution and held by 
another financial institution belonging to the same or another financial sector. Indirect inter-
connections arise where different financial institutions hold exposures to the same sectors, markets 
or instruments. 
Pension funds’ net assets grew in 2019 compared with the slowdown experienced in 2018. Net contributions remained negative which 
extended their decreasing trend, while returns started to pick up after posting negative values in 2018.
PENSION FUNDS
Chart 2.29
SOURCES: Inverco and CNMV.
a The data available on net contributions do not relate to total pension plans. The series is based on a sample which varies between 85.2% and 
99.18% of total pension funds (95.16% on average in the period).
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Direct interconnections with non-resident financial agents
The	liabilities	of	resident	financial	institutions	vis-à-vis	the	rest	of	the	world	
fell	considerably	after	the	crisis	and	stabilised	as	from	2013.	Chart 2.30 shows 
the assets and liabilities of other monetary financial institutions27 (OMFI) vis-à-vis the 
rest of the world. At present, liabilities vis-à-vis the rest of the world represent 22% 
of the total financial assets of OMFIs, which is 8 pp lower than before the global 
financial crisis. In June 2019, assets vis-à-vis the rest of the world represented 19% 
of total financial assets, their highest value in the series, after the upward trend 
which began in 2013.
The	cross-border	 interconnections	of	banks	and	 investment	 funds	 take	 the	
form	of	holdings	in	marketable	securities	issued	by	non-resident	institutions	
of	 identical	 financial	 sectors.	 Non-residents also own a significant portion of 
marketable securities issued by resident banks. Chart 2.31 shows, using the ECB’s 
27  OMFIs include banks, specialised lending institutions (SLIs), the ICO and money market investment 
funds. This information is from the Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy which gathers data 
from the the individual balance sheets of institutions in this sector which are resident in Spain. 
Consequently, it does not include exposures through subsidiaries which are not resident in Spain.
OMFI’s liabilities vis-à-vis the rest of the world fell considerably in absolute terms after the crisis and their relative weight in financial assets 
has also decreased by 4.6 pp since June 2011. The level of assets vis-à-vis the rest of the world has remained more stable but its weight in 
total financial assets has increased by 6.2 pp since the same date.
OMFI INTERCONNECTIONS WITH NON-RESIDENT AGENTS
Business in Spain, ID
Chart 2.30
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Includes interbank loans, among others.
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database on the marketable securities holdings28 of different financial sectors in the 
euro area, the total volume of direct interconnections with non-resident financial 
sectors of banks and investment funds resident in Spain in December 2018. The 
main direct cross-border connections are established through the holdings of 
resident banks (€29 billion) and resident investment funds (€70 billion) in instruments 
issued by non-resident institutions. However, certain significant interconnections in 
the opposite direction are observed, such as instruments issued by banks domiciled 
in Spain which are held by non-resident investment funds (€11 billion).
Indirect interconnections
More	than	70%	of	the	marketable	securities	holdings	of	banks	and	insurance	
companies resident in Spain are concentrated in Spanish issuers. Using once 
again the data compiled by the ECB, Chart 2.32 shows the weight that the most 
28  This database excludes data on loans and deposits. Furthermore, it only includes the marketable 
securities	holdings	of	financial	institutions	resident	in	Europe.	Consequently,	the	holdings	of	these	
institutions’ subsidiaries outside Europe are not included either.
The most significant direct cross-border interconnections by volume are due to resident investment funds’ holdings of marketable securities 
issued by non-resident investment funds (€70 billion), followed by resident banks’ holdings of marketable securities issued by non-resident 
banks (€29 billion). Resident investment funds scarcely have cross-border interconnections through their liabilities, whereas the latter are 
significant for resident banks.
DIRECT CROSS-BORDER INTERCONNECTIONS DUE TO HOLDING OF MARKETABLE SECURITIES
December 2018
Chart 2.31
SOURCE: ECB (Securities Holding Statistics by Sector).
a It shows resident institutions' asset holdings of marketable securities issued by non-resident sectors.
b It shows marketable securities issued by resident institutions which are held by non-resident sectors.
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exposed issuers from Spain and other geographical areas represent as a percentage 
of the total holdings of resident financial sectors. The importance of Spanish issuers 
is particularly significant for banks (accounting for more than 80% of their holdings) 
and insurance companies (around 70%). The most geographically diversified sectors 
are investment funds and pension funds.
The	various	 financial	 sectors	 resident	 in	Spain	hold	a	significant	 volume	of	
common	exposures	which	may	be	considered	a	contagion	mechanism.29 As a 
result of these common positions, all the sectors would be affected simultaneously 
by the same shock arising at one securities issuer. More importantly, a potential 
problem in one financial sector could push it into forced selling of assets which are 
also present in one or more other sectors. This could trigger substantial falls in the 
prices of these assets and, therefore, valuation losses for the other holding sectors, 
with the related implications for financial stability.
More	than	45%	of	the	positions	held	in	the	marketable	securities	portfolios	of	
banks,	funds	and	insurance	companies	overlap	with	other	financial	sectors. 
Chart 2.33 shows that the most significant common positions by marketable 
securities volume are those held by the banking sector with other financial sectors 
(approximately €285 billion). However, in order to assess this result properly, it should 
29  The metrics used in this section are similar to those shown in the ECB’s “Financial Stability Report” 
of November 2018 (section 3.2, particularly Chart 3.24 and the related sections).
The relevance of the Spanish issuers in the resident financial sectors portfolios is larger in banks and insurance companies.
MAIN MARKETABLE SECURITIES ISSUERS IN DOMESTIC FINANCIAL SECTORS HOLDINGS
December 2018
Chart 2.32
SOURCE: ECB (Securities Holding Statistics by Sector).
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be considered that banks’ assets mainly comprise loans, which are not included in 
this analysis. The common marketable securities holdings among non-bank 
financial sectors are of a smaller volume, but they are more significant relative to 
each sector’s total securities portfolio. In particular, the proportion of common 
positions in the securities portfolio of pension funds which overlaps with insurance 
companies and investment funds exceeds 75%.
The	 correlation	 of	 the	 holdings	 by	 issuer	 of	 the	 various	 financial	 sectors	
makes	 it	 possible	 to	 estimate	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 there	 is	 a	 similar	
distribution	 of	 securities	 in	 the	 portfolios.	 As at each date, the weights 
represented by the different individual issuers (e.g. a specific sovereign or non-
financial corporation) in each financial sector’s investment portfolio were 
measured. These data were used to calculate the correlation coefficient of these 
weights between each pair of financial sectors (e.g. banks and investment funds). 
An advantage of this measure is that it does not depend on the size of the portfolios 
and, therefore, is not affected by the differences in each sector’s total volume of 
holdings. A positive correlation between the portfolios of two sectors would indicate 
that the holdings whose volume is higher than the average of the total portfolio in 
one of the sectors are also above average in the portfolio of the other sector.
The banking sector has the highest overlap of exposures with other sectors, by volume of exposures. The degree of overlap, in relative terms, 
in the non-banking sector is greater than that in the banking sector but of a lower volume. Similarly, the investment fund and insurance 
company sectors have similar levels of overlap both in terms of volume and as a percentage of their total portfolios.
PORTFOLIO OVERLAP IN MARKETABLE SECURITIES (a)
December 2018
Chart 2.33
SOURCE: ECB (Securities Holding Statistics by Sector).
a The chart shows common holdings of marketable securities, which means ownership of identical securities issued by the same issuer. For example, 
of the common holdings between banks and investment funds, banks hold €284 billion, which represents 47% of their total portfolio; for their part, 
investment funds hold €114 billion, which represent 47% of their total portfolio. The market value of the holdings reported by the entities is considered 
(or, if appropriate, fair value).
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The correlation between financial sectors' portfolios at the level of individual securities has followed a declining trend. At the level of the 
issuer, the correlation is greater and the declining trend is much more contained.
CORRELATION OF PORTFOLIOS OF MARKETABLE SECURITIES
Chart 2.34
SOURCE: ECB (Securities Holding Statistics by Sector).
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This	 correlation	 is	 generally	 very	 high,	 above	 85%,	 in	 all	 the	 sector	 pairs. 
Chart 2.34 shows changes in the correlation between 2014 Q1 and 2018 Q4. There 
are two significant points to be underlined. On one hand, the correlation holds at 
high values and is relatively stable between banks and pension funds and, to a 
certain degree, also between insurance companies and pension funds. On the 
other, correlations of other sectors (e.g. banks and insurance companies, and 
investment funds and pension funds) show a slightly declining trend in recent years.
At the beginning of September, the main listed European 
banks had an average price-to-book (P/B) ratio of 0.7, 
compared with a P/B ratio of 1.3 for the main listed US 
banks.1 These valuation differences are not a reflection 
of the present situation as they have been persistent since 
the global financial crisis. Indeed, at the start of the crisis, 
both the European and the US banks posted a P/B ratio 
of 2. From then (2007-08) until March 2009, the P/B 
ratio fell sharply to 0.5, tracking a similar path in both 
samples, before subsequently embarking on a recovery 
that was much more pronounced in the United States. 
Thus, since 2010 and more clearly since 2011, average 
P/B ratios in the United States have been higher. They 
converged somewhat in 2014-15, but the gap has then 
widened again since 2016. The differences in P/B ratios 
are not confined to the average of the two samples; the 
distributions are statistically different in the periods 
2011-14 and 2016-19 (see Chart 1).
The numerator of the P/B ratio reflects the valuation made 
by banks’ investors. This will depend on their expectations 
as to banks’ future profitability, the level of risk-free interest 
rates and the risk premium demanded by them. 
By contrast, the denominator of the P/B ratio reflects banks’ 
book value, providing investors with useful information 
according to criteria that may be different from market 
value, including other principles (accounting prudence, 
stable valuation, etc.) that are not strictly based on market 
expectations. The fact that the P/B ratio of European banks 
has been persistently below 1 since 2009 implies that 
investors’ expectations of their value have been 
systematically lower than their value reflected by the 
accounting standards. By contrast, since the second half of 
2009, the P/B ratio of US banks has been above 1, indicating 
that expectations as to the value of bank shares are 
higher than the values reflected in the accounting records.
It is to be expected that investors formulate their 
expectations based, among other elements, on the financial 
information available at the time. This has given rise to a 
number of studies that establish a relationship between the 
P/B ratio and various financial ratios based on banks’ 
accounting statements.2 This box focuses on analysis of the 
relationship between banks’ P/B ratio, which reflects 
expected profitability, and their current profitability. Chart 2 
shows, for 2018 which is the last full year for which 
Box 2.1
EUROPEAN AND US BANKS: DIFFERENCES IN STOCK MARKET VALUATIONS AND PROFITABILITY
1  Based on two samples – one for the United States and one for Europe – of the 27 banks with the highest market cap in 
each area.
2  Some recent examples include: C. W. Calomiris and D. Nissim (2014), Journal of Financial Intermediation, 23, pp. 400-435; B. 
Bogdanova, I. Fender and E. Takáts (2018), BIS Quarterly Review; and M. Grodzicki, C. Rodriguez d’Acri and D. Vioto (2019), 
ECB Financial Stability Review, May 2019.
SOURCES: Datastream and Banco de España.
a For each date, the chart shows the simple average of the P/B ratio for the samples of the main listed European and US banks (27 in each case), and 
the p-value of a non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on the equality of the distributions of the P/B ratio in both samples. A p-value below 0.1 
denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of equality of distributions.
KOLMOGOROV–SMIRNOV TEST (right-hand scale)  EUROPE  USA
Chart 1
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data are available, that there is a positive relationship 
between return on equity (ROE) and the P/B ratio. It also 
shows, in almost all cases, that both ROE and the P/B 
ratio are higher at US banks than at their European 
counterparts. Accordingly, the banks with the highest 
current profitability in 2018 seem to be associated with 
higher expectations of discounted future profitability 
with respect to present book value.
Chart 3 shows the regression coefficients of the ROE ratio, 
as an explanatory factor of the P/B value ratio, in a series 
of cross-sectional regressions from 2007 to 2018, 
separating the European and US samples. The positive 
relationship between ROE and the P/B ratio observed in 
Chart 2 for 2018 is not confined to that year, as 
the coefficients are generally positive and significant for the 
different years, albeit not stable over time. With the onset 
of the crisis, the ROE coefficient for the European sample 
decreases significantly compared with that estimated for 
2007 (0.04), up to 2017 and 2018 when it rises to 0.05 and 
0.08, respectively. The coefficient is almost zero both in 
2008 and 2012, when the financial crisis in Europe was at 
its peak and support measures were approved for the 
banking and the sovereign sector.3 The coefficient is 
generally higher for US banks (0.06 on average) than for 
European banks (0.03 on average) and also varies over 
time. After dropping to a zero non-significant level in 2009, 
the year in which the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) 
was implemented, it has held above its pre-crisis levels 
and above the levels of European banks.
In accordance with these findings, the relationship 
between actual profitability and the P/B ratio is stronger 
for the United States in the geographical dimension, 
and for recent periods in the time dimension. This may be 
because investors perceive that current ROE has greater 
predictive power over future profitability, or because there 
is greater emphasis on short-term profitability. Correlation 
analysis does not permit distinction between the two 
explanations. In any event, it is important to note that in 
the years when critical support measures were approved 
for the banking sector, a disconnection between the two 
variables is observed.
Given the existence of this relationship, the next step is to 
analyse how this profitability measure for the main 
European and US banks has evolved in the period. Chart 4 
depicts the change in the ROE ratio in the two samples 
and shows how the initial stage of the crisis prompted a 
sharp slump in profitability in 2008. This was followed by 
a subsequent recovery up to 2010, as support measures 
for the banking sector were implemented in both areas, 
financial stress eased and activity recovered somewhat. 
From 2010 the paths began to diverge, with US banks 
recording a steady ROE ratio around 8%, compared with 
the much lower and more volatile level recorded by 
European banks. Indeed, their ROE fell significantly in 
2016 and especially in 2012, against the backdrop of the 
sovereign crisis and the renewed economic downturn. As 
was observed in Chart 1, there is a clear time parallel in the 
paths of the P/B ratio in the United States and Europe. 
The differences in profitability between the European and 
US banks in terms of ROE are greater if measured by 
return on total assets (ROA), owing to the differences in 
their leverage ratios (equity to total assets): the banks 
in the European sample had a leverage ratio of 6% in 2018, 
compared with 10.6% for the US banks (see Chart 5). 
ROA, which may be decomposed as the product of ROE 
and the leverage ratio, is higher for the US banks, as both 
ROE and the leverage ratio are lower in Europe. In terms of 
ROA, not only is there a positive difference in favour of the 
US banks in net income in the numerator, but the total 
assets of the European banks in the sample are 
considerably higher than those of their US counterparts,4 
thus driving down this ratio for the European sample.
In an attempt to investigate the causes of these differences in 
profitability aside of the level of leverage, Chart 5 also 
shows the income statement breakdown (in terms of total 
assets) of the banks in the US and the European samples 
for 2018. As the chart shows, the key factors for US banks’ 
higher profitability are their greater capacity to generate 
net income, through net interest income (2.1% in the 
United States compared with 1.2% in Europe) and through 
service fees and gains/losses on financial transactions 
that make up gross income (2% compared with 1%). 
Box 2.1
EUROPEAN AND US BANKS: DIFFERENCES IN STOCK MARKET VALUATIONS AND PROFITABILITY (cont’d)
3  See, for example, ECB Financial Stability Review, December 2008, Special Feature, “Recent Policy Initiatives to Strengthen 
the Resilience of the Financial System”, pp. 129-134; and ECB Financial Stability Review, December 2012, Chapter 3 on 
Financial Markets.
4  There are various reasons for this difference, including the different treatment of the scope of consolidation, especially as regards 
securitisations.
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Box 2.1
EUROPEAN AND US BANKS: DIFFERENCES IN STOCK MARKET VALUATIONS AND PROFITABILITY (cont’d)
SOURCES: Datastream, SNL and Banco de España.
a The chart depicts the average P/B ratio in 2018 (vertical axis) and ROE in 2018 (horizontal axis) of the 54 banks making up the two samples. The 
crosses denote the median values of P/B and ROE of the European and US banks.
b For each year of the period 2007-2018, a cross-sectional regression is made: P/Bi = αUSA × IUSA + αEUR × IEUR + βUSA × ROEi × IUSA + βEUR × ROEi × 
IEUR + 𝜀𝜀i where P/Bi and ROEi are the price-to-book and ROE ratios of bank i, IUSA and IEUR denote that they belong to either the US or the European 
sample, αUSA and αEUR are constants corresponding to the samples of European and US banks, and βUSA and βEUR are the coefficients of the ROE 
effect corresponding to the samples of European and US banks. The identity of the coefficients is examined by means of a null hypothesis test (H0: 
βUSA = βEUR) based on the F statistic. The orange markers in the chart denote the p-values. The standard errors used are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
The coefficients βUSA and βEUR are individually significant in all the regressions, except in 2008 for Europe and in 2009 for the United States.
c The left-hand side of the chart depicts the income statement breakdown in terms of total assets of the main European and US banks. The righthand 
side presents the leverage ratio, defined as equity to total assets.
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Box 2.1
EUROPEAN AND US BANKS: DIFFERENCES IN STOCK MARKET VALUATIONS AND PROFITABILITY (cont’d)
This capacity to generate income more than offsets their 
higher operating expenses (2.5% compared with 1.4%) 
and the absence of significant differences in impairment 
losses and other income. Adverse factors that have marred 
European banks’ profitability since the start of the crisis, 
such as the declining volume of productive assets, falling 
net interest income and business models with a low share 
of net income other than net interest income, would appear 
to be still contributing in 2018 to the lower profitability of 
the main listed European banks in comparison with their 
US counterparts.
The analysis presented here shows that the differences in 
stock market valuations between US and European 
banks that emerged after the financial crisis of 2008 are 
still in place. It also identifies signs that additional 
recovery in European banks’ profitability would help 
close the valuation gap. However, this improved 
profitability should not be achieved at the expense of 
sacrificing a prudent funding structure (for instance, 
by taking on excess leverage), as this would drive up 
the risk premia demanded by investors and thus limit 
improvements in P/B ratios.  
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This chapter presents the systemic vulnerability and risk analysis performed regularly 
by the Banco de España as a basis for its macroprudential policy actions. Specifically, 
the first section uses two tools, the heat map and the systemic risk indicator, that 
provide a first approximation to recent risk developments. The second part presents a 
study in greater depth of the time/cyclical dimension of systemic risk and presents an 
ex-ante impact analysis of setting a positive countercyclical capital buffer rate. This 
analysis suggests that, according to the forecasts currently available, various 
reference indicators will exceed the thresholds for activation of this buffer in the first 
half of 2021. If this macroprudential instrument is activated, the credit institutions 
affected will have a period of 12 months to comply with the requirement. However, 
this diagnosis is dependent upon materialisation of the central forecast scenario, 
which is currently subject to numerous downside risks. Should these risks materialise 
the above analysis would have to be adjusted accordingly. 
3.1 Analysis of systemic vulnerabilities
The	 map	 of	 systemic	 vulnerability	 indicators	 shows	 no	 signs	 of	 build-up	 of	
systemic	 risk1 (see Chart 3.1). The heat map categories that group together credit, 
liquidity and macroeconomic imbalance indicators have remained stable at absence-of-
alert levels since the last edition of the FSR. In the case of indicators related to credit 
growth, it should be noted that during the first two quarters of 2019 total credit to the 
non-financial private sector (referring to total financing to this sector, not only banking 
credit) posted slightly positive growth rates, for the first time since 2010. For the time 
being, the real estate market indicators show no signs of risk either, since the sustained 
increase in house prices has still not translated into widespread overvaluation. In fact, in 
both cases, the absence of alerts is due to the fact that the starting levels were well 
below the thresholds that trigger alerts in the heat map. Accordingly, for a change in the 
degree of risk to occur, the trends observed in recent periods would have to be sustained.
1  The map of systemic vulnerability indicators aggregates data from a broad set of indicators, according to 
their	ability	to	predict	systemic	banking	crises.	The	definitions	of	the	main	categories	correspond	to	those	
established by the European Systemic Risk Board in its Recommendation ESRB/2013/1 on intermediate 
objectives and instruments of macro prudential policy. For the chart to be interpreted correctly it needs to 
be taken into account that the intensity of the alerts in each category represents a weighted average of the 
indicators included. Intensity increases as the tone draws closer to red, while green depicts a normal 
situation.	Details	of	the	specific	indicators	included	in	each	category,	and	of	how	their	weights	are	calculated,	
are to be found in Mencía, J. and Saurina, J. (2016) “Macroprudential policy: objectives, instruments and 
indicators”, Occasional Paper No. 1601, Banco de España.
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The	liquidity	indicators	reflect	a	situation	of	low	risk,2	partly	as	a	consequence	
of	the	ECB’s	accommodative	monetary	policy,	and	improvements	are	observed	
in the concentration indicators. The liquidity indicator is made up, on the one 
hand, of information on market liquidity and, on the other, of indicators of liquidity on 
bank balance sheets. The indicators relating to the liquidity on bank balance sheets 
have shown no signs that would give rise to concern, while the market indicators have 
shown somewhat more volatility, although also improvements in the case of 
government debt liquidity in the first half of 2019. In general, market liquidity is 
expected to continue to improve following the ECB’s decision to implement further 
medium-term refinancing operations. The risk level of the concentration indicators 
has fallen to medium-low. This is because the concentration of credit among large 
firms has declined, while exposure to the construction and real estate development 
sectors continues to fall, as part of the process of improvement in the quality of bank 
balance sheets mentioned in Chapter 2. Financial market turbulence, meanwhile, 
decreased slightly in the first half of 2019 from the levels recorded at the end of last 
year, partly as a result of the measures implemented by many central banks. Finally, 
the macroeconomic imbalance indicators and the indicators of the current economic 
and financial situation remained unchanged.
2  One of the indicators that made up this subgroup in previous editions of the FSR has had to be replaced by 
another as it has ceased to be available. It is for this reason that its level has been revised retrospectively. 
The map of systemic vulnerabilities, designed to provide early warning of systemic banking crises, remains stable without any risk or low-risk 
warnings, while the imbalances and the economic and financial situation have not seen any changes in grading.
HEAT MAP BY SUB-CATEGORY (a) (b)
Chart 3.1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The colour scheme identifies four levels of risk: i) green denotes a normal, risk-free situation, ii) yellow indicates low risk, iii) orange is medium risk and, 
iv) red is high risk. The shaded band denotes the last systemic crisis. Some indicators as at December 2018 are based on provisional information.
b The 2019 indicators are available up to June 2019.
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The	systemic	risk	indicator	(SRI)	has	declined	during	2019 (see Chart 3.2). That 
said, the volatility measures in this indicator have increased in recent months. These 
episodes of market volatility stem from the downward skew of global growth 
prospects and from new geopolitical tensions, the trade war between the United 
States and China, and the possibility of a no-deal Brexit. The recent developments 
in these episodes have not been reflected by the aggregate SRI as they have been 
confined to specific markets, showing a low correlation with other components of 
the indicator. This also indicates that the episodes have not been systemic in scope. 
In any event, it should be taken into account that the SRI indicator is a coincident 
indicator of the financial situation and, therefore, is not designed to anticipate future 
risks. In fact, this indicator currently stands at extraordinarily low levels, not seen 
since the years prior to the last financial crisis. It is not possible to rule out that the 
markets are, as then, underestimating the significant risks that exist, so that sudden 
changes in their perception may lead to significant rises in this indicator. 
The	Banco	de	España	is	starting	to	analyse	other	risks	to	medium	and	long-
term	 financial	stability, including those deriving from the energy transition and 
climate change, and from potential changes in market structure as a result of 
technological change, which is conducive to the entry of new competitors. The role 
of the financial system in the management of these risks is also being analysed. 
Box 3.1 provides a general outline of the economic risks associated with climate 
change, and of the various initiatives existing in the financial sector to address 
them, while Box 3.2 describes the risks to financial stability associated with the 
project to create Libra.
In 2019 to date, the systemic risk indicator (SRI) has remained at historically very low levels.
SYSTEMIC RISK (a)
Chart 3.2
SOURCES: Datastream and Banco de España.
a For a detailed explanation of this indicator, see Box 1.1 in the May 2013 FSR.
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3.2 Macroprudential policy instruments and actions
In	2019	Q3	and	Q4,	the	Banco	de	España	has	held	the	countercyclical	capital	
buffer	rate	(CCyB)	at	0%. This decision is based on a technical analysis of quantitative 
indicators combined with qualitative information. The quantitative indicators that 
guide the CCyB decisions include indicators intended to reflect the stage of the credit 
cycle of the non-financial private sector and its excessive growth, the potential 
overvaluation of house prices, the burden of interest and principal payments on loans 
to households and firms (debt service), the external imbalance and the macroeconomic 
environment.3 The technical analysis assesses the recent developments in the 
indicators, their current situation and also their expected behaviour over the next few 
quarters, in line with the macroeconomic forecasts prepared on a quarterly basis by 
the Banco de España.4 This latter element is very important, because, in the event 
that the CCyB is activated, institutions have 12 months to comply with the requirement. 
The	 credit	 cycle	 indicator	 continues	 to	 show	 values	 below	 the	 activation	
thresholds	 (in	 terms	 of	 the	 credit-to-GDP	 ratio,	 which	 remains	 below	 its	 
long-term	trend	value),	although	it	is	progressively	approaching	equilibrium. 
Specifically, the adjusted credit-to-GDP gap which assumes a credit cycle duration in 
line with the empirical evidence for Spain, is still showing a negative value (–8 pp on 
data to June 2019), although it is progressively approaching the activation threshold 
of 2 pp.5 The upward trend of this indicator has been evident since the end of the last 
crisis (see Chart 3.3). The projections for this indicator over the next few years 
suggest that it will become positive in around 2021 Q1 and could exceed the 
activation threshold in Q2 of that year. The available econometric models – which 
estimate the equilibrium level of the credit-to-GDP ratio on the basis of its relationship 
with other fundamental macro-financial variables according to economic theory – 
also currently show negative gaps with respect to this equilibrium level, which are 
rapidly shrinking.6
The	output	gap,	meanwhile,	has	been	positive	since	the	beginning	of	the	year,	
and	is	projected	to	expand	in	future. This suggests that the level of GDP is now 
3  A technical analysis of the selection of indicators used can be consulted in Castro, C., Estrada, A. and 
Martínez, J. (2016), “The Countercyclical Capital Buffer in Spain: An Analysis of Key Guiding Indicators”, 
Working Paper No. 1601, Banco de España.
4  See, for example, Banco de España (2019): “Quarterly report on the Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin, 
Banco de España, 3/2019, pp. 5-67.
5  A description of the adjusted gap and its performance can be found in Box 3.2 of the Spring 2019 FSR. For 
details of the calculation of the adjusted gap and a comparison with the Basel gap and other alternatives, 
see Galán, J.E. (2019), “Measuring	credit-to-GDP	gaps.	The	Hodrick-Prescott	filter	revisited”, Occasional 
paper No. 1906, Banco de España.
6  For further information on these models, see Galán, J.E. and J. Mencía (2018), “Empirical Assessment of 
Alternative Structural Methods for Identifying Cyclical Systemic Risk in Europe”, Working Paper No. 1825, 
Banco de España.
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above its long-term equilibrium value, following several years of above-potential 
growth. It appears that this growth will continue over the next two years, even 
following the downward revision to the economic outlook. 
Some	complementary	 quantitative	 indicators	 also	point	 to	 a	 growing	 trend	
over	the	next	two	years.	In particular, credit intensity, which measures the change 
in credit as a percentage of GDP, and house prices (see Chart 3.4) currently display 
values close to equilibrium, with an upward trend that is projected to continue over the 
next two years. Thus, credit intensity posted a positive value in 2019 Q1. Although 
this value is still low and, on June 2019 data, it will return to negative territory, this 
is the first time that it has been positive since the start of the crisis. The case of 
the indicators of house price imbalances is similar, insofar as narrowly positive 
values were observed for some of its basic components during the first two quarters 
of 2019, with the average remaining very close to equilibrium. If the expected trend 
in house prices continues, all the indicators in this category can be expected to 
show positive values towards the end of next year. As regards the debt service of the 
non-financial private sector, the decline that began at the beginning of the global 
financial crisis has continued. Currently, the adjustment of this indicator has been a 
consequence of the deleveraging in this sector, although, subsequently, the reduction 
in interest rates has also made a significant contribution. In consequence, this 
reduction can be expected to continue, albeit at a more moderate pace over the next 
The output gap has continued to show positive values and is expected to do so for the next two years. The adjusted credit-to-GDP gap, 
meanwhile, continues to narrow and this process has accelerated in the first two quarters of 2019. This gap is expected to turn positive at 
the beginning of 2021.
OUTPUT GAP AND CREDIT-TO-GDP GAP (a)
Chart 3.3
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The shaded area shows the last period of systemic banking crisis (2009 Q1-2013 Q4). The dotted lines represent forecasts.
b The output gap is the percentage difference between the observed GDP and potential GDP. Values calculated at constant 2010 prices. See 
Cuadrado, P. and Moral-Benito, E. (2016), "Potential growth of the Spanish economy", Occasional Paper 1603, Banco de España.
c The credit-to-GDP gap is calculated as the difference, in percentage points, between the observed ratio and the long-term trend calculated using a 
one-sided Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter equal to 25,000. This value is more in line with the financial cycles historically observed 
in Spain.
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two years, given that the debt reduction process has slowed significantly and interest 
rates have little room to fall further. Finally, the current account balance continues to 
show a small surplus (see Chart 3.4) and is expected to remain relatively stable over 
the next few years. 
Although	the	macroeconomic	environment	may	appear	potentially	favourable	
for	 activation	 of	 the	 CCyB,	 this	 diagnosis	 depends	 upon	 materialisation	 
The complementary indicators for calibration of the CCyB show no signs of cyclical systemic risk build-up, although, if current trends 
continue, those relating to credit and prices in the real-estate sector will show some signs of alert over the next two years.
COMPLEMENTARY INDICATORS TO GUIDE THE SETTING OF THE CCyB (a)
Chart 3.4
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The shaded area shows the last period of systemic banking crisis (2009 Q1-2013 Q4). The dotted lines and lightly shaded area represent forecasts.
b The credit intensity indicator is calculated as the annual change in credit to the non-financial private sector divided by cumulative GDP of the last 
four quarters.
c The shaded area represents the range between the minimum and maximum values of the set of four indicators of imbalances in the real estate 
sector.
d Ratio of debt service in the non-financial private sector calculated as specified in Drehmann M. and M. Juselius (2012) "Do debt service costs affect 
macroeconomic and financial stability?", BIS Quarterly Review, September.
e The current account balance series is expressed as a percentage of GDP and seasonally adjusted.
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of	 the	 central	 projection	 scenario,	 which	 is	 currently	 subject	 to	 numerous	
downside	risk	factors. Since legislation specifies that institutions must, in normal 
circumstances, have a one-year margin between activation of the CCyB and when 
they are required to comply with it, the expected behaviour of the relevant indicators 
should be given significant weight in the decision-making process. This diagnosis 
must be conditional upon materialisation of the central macro-financial projection 
scenario. If any of the risks mentioned before were to materialise (geopolitical 
uncertainty, the risk of a no-deal Brexit, intensification of the trade war, delay in the 
recovery of economic growth in the euro area), this diagnosis would be subject to 
change. In short, the current setting warrants keeping the CCyB at 0% for the time 
being. That said, both the short-term risks and the behaviour and projections of the 
indicators, mainly those relating to credit, house prices and economic growth, need 
to be closely monitored.
The	CCyB	is	an	instrument	designed	to	be	released	in	recessions. It is important 
that all financial system agents internalise the fact that, due to its countercyclical 
nature, the CCyB is designed to be built up during the expansionary phase of the 
cycle and released during recessions or sharp economic slowdowns, when banks 
may begin to record losses on their lending and to consume capital. If, in these 
circumstances, institutions are not permitted to reduce their levels of total capital 
by the amount of the previously accumulated buffer, the result may be a notably 
restricted supply of credit that further deepens the recession. Note that, when the 
economy is at the bottom of the cycle, banks’ profits fall and investors’ risk perception 
may be very pessimistic, seriously limiting the ability of banks to obtain funds 
internally (by retaining earnings) or externally. In these circumstances, the most likely 
solution is that they will reduce the size of their balance sheets and the supply of 
credit. Naturally, the intensification of the recession will tend to further worsen the 
situation of the banks. 
Decisions	regarding	the	timing	of	the	release	will	be	taken	on	the	basis	of	a	set	
of	quantitative	and	qualitative	indicators	of	the	situation	of	the	financial	cycle. 
As Recommendation 2014/1 of the ESRB indicates, the same indicators that are 
used to calculate the CCyB may also contain useful information for its release. 
However, these indicators may provide imprecise information, as they were not 
designed specifically for this purpose. For this reason, the ESRB also recommends 
using information on bank funding markets, as well as indicators of general systemic 
stress in the financial markets. For example, the SRI presented in Chart 3.2 would 
come under this second category. Thus a significant and sustained increase in the 
SRI would be a possible signal that would help to identify the optimum moment for 
release. Obviously, this decision should also be based on leading indicators of 
economic activity.
In	 the	 event	 of	 release	 of	 the	 CCyB,	 the	 effect	 on	 the	 requirements	 for	
institutions should be immediate. Recommendation 2014/1 of the ESRB 
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advocates release of the CCyB without delay when systemic risk materialises, so as 
to moderate institutions’ procyclical behaviour and facilitate the absorption of losses. 
However, the recommendation itself indicates that a gradual release would be 
preferable when risks are not observed to materialise but are judged to recede. 
The	Banco	 de	España	 is	 carrying	 out	 various	 studies	 on	 the	 impact	 that	 a	
potential	 activation	 of	 the	 CCyB	would	 have	 on	 credit	 to	 the	 non-financial	
private sector and on other macroeconomic variables. First, it is possible to 
estimate the cost of activating the CCyB in terms of credit using a structural vector 
autoregressive model. In principle, a standardised 1 pp increase in the CCyB during 
an upswing may lead to reductions in credit of up to 1.4 pp. The maximum effects 
would occur between one and two years after activation. However, the empirical 
evidence shows that release of the buffer during systemic crises has a much greater 
positive impact, mitigating the contraction in credit. 
In	this	respect,	the	experience	of	use	of	dynamic	provisions	in	Spain	provides	
useful	 lessons	 regarding	 the	potential	 impact	of	 the	CCyB. In particular, the 
available studies indicate that the introduction of countercyclical provisions in an 
expansionary setting, which is similar to the activation of the CCyB, had no effect 
on aggregate lending, although it may have caused some changes in portfolio 
composition at the most affected banks. However, the most notable effect is that 
stemming from the release of these countercyclical provisions in recessions. On the 
basis of this evidence, it is estimated that an increase of 1 pp in the CCyB during an 
upswing would provide, in the event of release during a systemic crisis, additional 
lending to businesses of up to 5.5 pp and would have a positive effect on the 
probability of their survival and on employment.7
The	evolution	of	bank	capital	 in	Spain	over	the	last	150	years	has	also	been	
analysed,	providing very rich information on the behaviour of capital over varied 
financial cycles and in very different banking activity environments.8 This analysis 
also indicates that the activation of the CCyB during upswings generates relatively 
limited costs: a CCyB requirement of 1 pp moderates credit growth by around 
0.8 pp. However, the benefits arising from the release of the CCyB during systemic 
crises clearly exceed these costs, and can even mitigate the fall in lending by 6 pp 
during a recession. This suggests that the adverse impact of their activation on 
credit growth during upswings is more than offset by the positive effect of their 
release during systemic crises. 
7  Jiménez, G. Ongena, S., Peydró, J.L. and J. Saurina (2017): “Macroprudential Policy, Countercyclical Bank 
Capital Buffers and Credit Supply: Evidence from the Spanish Dynamic Provisioning Experiments”, Journal 
of Political Economy, Vol. 125, No 6.
8  Bedayo, M. Estrada, A. and J. Saurina (2018), “Bank capital, lending booms and busts. Evidence from 
Spain in the last 150 years”,	Working	Paper	No.	1847,	Banco	de	España,	also	find	that	an	increase	of	1	pp	
in the CCyB in anticipation of a global systemic crisis reduces the decline in credit in recessions by 6 pp.
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Accordingly,	the	empirical	evidence	available	for	the	case	of	Spain	shows	the	
existence	 of	 significant	 asymmetry	 between	 the	 (relatively)	 low	 costs	 of	
activating	the	CCyB	and	the	(relatively)	large	benefits	of	their	release	during	
downturns. That in turn indicates the importance of the release process being 
supported by clear and transparent communication, generating adequate 
expectations and incentives for economic agents and the general public.
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Recuadro ?
TÍTULO RECUADRO
Climate change associated with global warming has 
become a major social concern in recent years. In 
consequence, the authorities of various countries have 
assumed multilateral commitments to try to mitigate this 
phenomenon. Specifically, the 2015 Paris Agreement1 
established a plan of action with the aim of holding the 
increase in the global average temperature below 2°C 
above pre-industrial levels2 and pursuing efforts to limit 
the temperature increase to 1.5°C. According to the 
estimates of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), human activities have already caused 
approximately 1°C of global warming over pre-industrial 
levels. At the current pace, warming of 1.5°C would be 
reached between 2030 and 2052.3 Considerable reductions 
in greenhouse gas emissions would have to be achieved in 
coming decades to keep global warming below 2ºC. 
Climate change could have a highly negative impact at the 
macroeconomic level,4 and in the financial sector, 
particularly in the long term. The potential mitigating 
measures will have a short-term but smaller impact, 
especially if they are implemented on a step-by-step basis, 
allowing agents to adapt to the changes gradually. It 
seems logical that the later the measures are adopted, the 
more aggressive they will have to be, and this will heighten 
their negative impact as they will be concentrated in a 
shorter period of time.5
Given these considerations, the climate change-related 
risks facing the financial system may be divided into two 
categories: physical risks and transition risks. Physical 
risks are those associated either with global warming 
or with the increased frequency and intensity of climate 
events such as droughts, floods or storms. Such events can, 
for instance, cause property damage and business 
disruption that may lead to financial losses. If these 
losses are insured they will be covered by the insurance 
sector,6 but if that is not the case they will have to be met 
by the households or firms concerned, which could drive 
up customer NPLs. Additionally, gradual physical risks, 
which can deteriorate relatively extensive economic 
areas, could lead to increases in NPLs and lower the 
valuation of some assets.
Transition risks are associated with the process of 
adjustment towards a low-carbon economy, for which 
purpose greenhouse gas emissions must be reduced. This 
transition is also relevant for the financial system, 
given that the introduction of certain policies, such as CO2 
emission limits or carbon taxes, technological innovation 
or changes in agents’ preferences or in market sentiment, 
could affect an economy’s demand and production 
patterns and could prompt valuation losses for certain 
financial assets, with an adverse effect on some branches 
of activity and a favourable effect on others, similarly to the 
effects on the firms themselves.7
The banking sector is subject both to physical and transition 
risks, which may manifest as credit, market and 
operational risks [see Bank of England (2018)].8 In its risk 
map for 2019, the ECB banking supervision again included 
climate change-related risks among the risks to be monitored 
from a supervisory standpoint.9 The ECB, drawing on an 
analysis of the exposure of the euro area banking sector, 
notes that, despite the limited data availability, climate 
change-related risks have the potential to become 
Box 3.1
HE FINAN IAL SYSTEM AND CLIMATE CHANGE
1  See Paris Agreement (2015).
2  Likely ranging between 0.8ºC and 1.2ºC. See IPCC (2018), “Summary for Policymakers. In: Global Warming of 1.5 °C”.
3  IPCC (2018). “Summary for Policymakers. In: Global Warming of 1.5 °C”.
4  For a compilation of studies on the macroeconomic impact, see NGFS (2019), “Macroeconomic	and	financial	stability.	Implications	
of climate change”. July 2019.
5  European Systemic Risk Board (2016), “Too late, too sudden: Transition to a low-carbon economy and systemic risk”. ESRB. 
Reports	of	the	Advisory	Scientific	Committee	No	6	/	February.
6  In Spain, the functions of the Consorcio de Compensación de Seguros (Insurance Compensation Consortium), a public body 
attached to the Ministry of Economy and Enterprise with legal personality, include coverage of extraordinary risks, providing 
compensation for damage caused by natural phenomena.
7  See NGFS (2019), “Macroeconomic	and	financial	stability.	Implications	of	climate	change”. July 2019. 
8  See Bank of England (2018), “Transition in thinking: The impact of climate change on the UK banking sector”. Bank of England. 
Prudential Regulation Authority. September 2018.
9  See ECB (2019), “ECB Banking Supervision: Risk Assessment for 2019”.
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Box 3.1
THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND CLIMATE CHANGE (cont’d) 
systemic for the euro area, in particular if markets are not 
pricing the risks correctly.10 Figure 1 shows the disruptive 
potential of the possible combinations of physical and 
transition risks.11
The financial system also has a role to play in this transition. 
One of the Paris Agreement’s goals was that financial flows 
be made consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse 
gas emissions and climate-resilient development. The 
changes needed to comply with the Paris Agreement’s 
goals entail increasing investment and shifting resources. 
The estimates depend on the scenarios assumed, but 
according to the European Commission’s Action Plan on 
Financing Sustainable Growth, an annual investment gap of 
almost €180 billion would have to be met to achieve the 
energy and climate goals in the period 2021-2030. 
In the institutional sphere, several initiatives have been 
launched related to the role of the financial system in climate 
change, notably the G20’s work,12 the FSB’s Task Force on 
Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), the European 
Commission’s Action Plan on Financing Sustainable Growth 
and the EBA’s work on sustainable finance. 
Central banks are also working to include the possible 
implications of climate change in their analysis and their 
supervisory and macroprudential policy. At the end of 
2017 the Network for Greening the Financial System 
(NGFS)13 was launched and now comprises (at September 
2019) 42 central banks and supervisors and eight 
observers. Its purpose is to define and promote best 
practice both within and outside of its membership, 
conduct analytical work on green finance, contribute 
SOURCE: NGFS (2019).
Table 1
PHYSICAL AND TRANSITION RISKS
Too little, too late
If we don't do enough to meet climate goals, 
the presence of physical risks spurs a disorderly 
transition.
Strength of response
(based on whether climate targets are met)
Orderly
We start reducing emissions now in a measured 
way to meet climate goals.
Met Not met
D
is
or
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ly
Physical risks
T
ra
ns
iti
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n
p
at
hw
ay
Disorderly
Sudden and unanticipated response is disruptive 
but sufficient enough to meet climate goals.
Hot house world
We continue to increase emissions, doing very 
little, if anything, to avert the physical risks.O
rd
er
ly
T
ransitio
n
risks
10  See ECB (2019), “Climate	change	and	financial	stability”, Financial Stability Review, May 2019.
11  European Commission (2018), “Action Plan: Financing Sustainable Growth”,	COM(2018)	97	final.
12  G20 GFSG (Green Finance Study Group) (2016), “G-20 Green Finance Synthesis Report”, September.
13  At the initiative of the Banque de France at the Paris One Planet Summit, initially comprising eight central banks and supervisors. 
The Banco de España joined the network in April 2018; the Deputy Governor is a member of the Plenary Meeting.
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Box 3.1
HE FINAN IAL SYSTEM AND CLIMATE CHANGE (cont’d)
to the development of environment and climate risk 
management in the financial sector, and mobilise the 
necessary finance to make the transition toward a 
sustainable economy.14
As indicated in the ECB’s Financial Stability Review 
(2019), a deeper understanding of the relevance of climate 
change-related risks for the euro area financial system is 
needed. For that purpose, better data availability and 
the development of a forward-looking framework for 
assessment of these risks are important.15 The TCFD’s work 
to develop climate-related financial disclosures (albeit not 
compulsory but only voluntary for firms and institutions) is 
helping to achieve progress in the field of information 
disclosure. Likewise, development of the European 
Commission’s Action Plan on Financing Sustainable 
Growth, which includes development of a taxonomy of 
sustainable activities and standards, will help to move 
towards a better assessment of these risks. There is, 
however, still more work to be done to understand all the 
possible implications for the financial system.
The Banco de España is aware of the importance of this 
and is also beginning to develop its own strategy to analyse 
the possible implications of climate change for the stability 
of the Spanish financial system and determine the 
responses it may adopt in its supervisory role. In addition, 
several activities and initiatives are under way to help raise 
awareness of the importance of this issue. 
Specifically, a number of high-level meetings have been held 
with representatives of credit institutions, audit firms and 
portfolio managers, to convey to them the institutional 
and regulatory developments in this field, verify how 
prepared they are in respect of climate change-related 
risks and establish a dialogue with them. At the same time, 
the necessary analytical tools are being developed for 
assessing and modelling transition risk and its potential 
impact on credit institutions.16
Data availability is one of the main challenges in this area, 
and one of the Banco de España’s first goals is to correct 
the data shortfalls in this field, for example relating to firms’ 
individual CO2 emissions and to environmental certificates 
of real assets such as housing. 
The Banco de España has also begun to include environmental 
sustainability goals in its reserves management, 
participating, for example, in the open-ended green bond 
investment fund launched by the BIS.17 
Lastly, it should be noted that the Banco de España 
actively participates in several international groups such as 
the NGFS, and in the remit of the ECB, ESRB, SSM and 
EBA, helping to make headway in the analysis of the 
implications of climate change for the financial system and 
the regulatory discussions this may entail.
14	 	The	NGFS’s	 initial	work	 focused	on	 six	 recommendations:	 i)	 including	climate-related	 risks	 in	 financial	 stability	monitoring	and	
microsupervision; ii) including sustainability factors in own portfolio management; iii) remedying data gaps; iv) raising awareness 
and fomenting knowledge exchange; v) obtaining sound and coherent climate and environmental data at the international level; and 
vi) supporting the development of a taxonomy of economic activities.
15  See ECB (2019), “Climate	change	and	financial	stability”, Financial Stability Review, May 2019.
16  The forthcoming Financial Stability Review of Banco de España will present a study on Spanish banks’ exposure to the sectors 
most susceptible to transition risk, together with an analysis of their credit quality.
17  See press release of 26 September 2019. 
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HE IB A PROJECT: KEY CHARACTERISTICS AND RISKS
The Libra White Paper, published on 18 June, formalised the 
project to create a new cryptocurrency sponsored and 
promoted by Facebook. The initiative is still at the definition 
stage, with 28 strategic partners from various origins 
– tech companies, some key financial industry players, 
representatives of non-profit organisations and academics, 
among others – having expressed interest so far.
According to its promoters, Libra’s fundamental goal is to 
help raise global financial inclusion levels. Specifically, it 
seeks to combine the characteristics of virtual currencies 
(global reach and low volatility) with those of an 
infrastructure that will allow transactions to be completed 
quickly and efficiently, using blockchain technology, digital 
wallets and smart contracts.
Compared with other cryptocurrencies,1 Libra presents a 
series of notable differences. First, the idea is that it will be 
backed by a basket of deposits and other low-risk high-
liquidity assets. The Libra Reserve, as it is called, will be 
denominated in the main global currencies and 
administered by a network of custodians worldwide. The 
returns obtained on these investments will be used to 
cover the costs of the system and to pay dividends to the 
partners. Naturally, any change in price in the underlying 
assets will affect the price of each unit of Libra in any 
national currency at any given time.
Second, the initial governance model of Libra will not be 
decentralised. Rather, a non-profit foundation has been 
set up – the Libra Association – based in Switzerland, 
which will be responsible for coordinating the founding 
members when it comes to making the necessary 
technical, business and management decisions. The aim 
is to ensure the orderly development and correct 
functioning of Libra. The Association will also have the 
exclusive right to create and destroy the cryptocurrency 
monetary units and to determine the Libra Reserve’s 
management policy.
Lastly, turning to the more technical aspects, Libra is 
based on open-code software. A new programming 
language has been developed to simplify the writing of the 
code and safeguard the integrity of the blockchain. In 
addition, the network will be administered by a small 
number of validator nodes, to be confined initially to the 
founding members.
From the regulatory standpoint, discussions are still ongoing 
as to the regulations – current or new – that will govern the 
new cryptocurrency. If it were considered a deposit, it 
would have to be subject to banking regulation, as this is a 
regulated activity. However, in the Libra proposal there 
appears to be no explicit obligation to refund the amount 
deposited in full. It is also unclear if it can be considered 
electronic money; if it were, it would be subject to the 
Electronic Money Directive, but for that to be the case, any 
holder of Libras would be entitled to be reimbursed by the 
issuer at any time and for the nominal amount. If it were 
considered a financial product it would come under the 
investor protection umbrella, but that does not square with 
the fact that the main intention is for it to be used as a 
means of payment. In any event, there must be assurance 
that Libra customers will receive all the necessary 
information on the product and that they understand 
how it works. 
Turning to the data protection aspect, the lack of 
international harmonisation may be an impediment for a 
proposal with such a global reach. What does seem much 
clearer, according to the published information, is that 
Libra would come under the scope both of the anti-money 
laundering regulations, in its capacity as a platform for 
exchange of a fiat currency for a virtual currency, and the 
counter terrorist financing regulations, as a provider of 
custodial services for electronic wallets.
Given that Libra has the three functions of money – a 
means of payment, a unit of account and a store of value 
– it is essential that it be correctly regulated, considering 
the possible implications for macroeconomic and financial 
stability if it were to fully evolve as a cross-border retail 
means of payment. And more so, if it were to cross over 
from retail payments and gain acceptance in the world of 
wholesale payments. 
Firstly, it may have a significant impact on the 
effectiveness of monetary policy and the role of central 
banks. Given its multilateral nature, it could reduce 
monetary authorities’ ability to influence domestic 
1	 	The	analysis	in	this	box	is	confined	to	privately	issued	cryptocurrencies.	For	a	detailed	analysis	of	the	advantages	and	disadvantages	
of central bank-issued digital currency, see “Central bank digital currencies”, BIS, the Committee on Payments and Market 
Infrastructures (CPMI) and the Markets Committee, March 2018.
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Box 3.2
HE IB A PROJECT: KEY CHARACTERISTICS AND RISKS (cont’d)
interest rates if it tries to hold the exchange rate steady, as 
it would encourage capital flows. Moreover, to the extent 
that a crypto-asset of this kind may become a generally 
accepted means of payment, in its capacity as a private 
money issuer it could affect the money creation process. 
This could also have fiscal implications as it would reduce 
seigniorage income. 
Regarding financial stability risks, Libra may make the 
aggregate money supply procyclical, as it will allow assets 
that are not easily convertible (emerging market domestic 
currencies) to be transformed into much more liquid assets 
(Libra). It is important to remember that when a unit 
of Libra is created, the money used does not disappear, 
but is invested in other financial assets. Besides, it may 
have a significant impact on the business of financial 
institutions, becoming a strong competitor and weakening 
both their income (fees) and their source of funding 
(deposits and other finantial instruments). 
Lastly, as it is a global currency, with access to the data of 
more than 2.4 billion potential users and with scarcely no 
transaction costs, it may contribute significantly to the 
international transmission of local shocks as it encourages 
capital inflows and outflows, with major implications for 
exchange rate shifts and volatility.
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CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET
DEPOSIT INSTITUTIONS
Annex 1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Difference between funds received in liquidity-providing operations and funds delivered in absorbing operations. June 2019 data.
b Difference calculated in basis points.
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Annex 2
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ISO COUNTRY CODES
IGBM Índice General de la Bolsa de Madrid (Madrid Stock Exchange 
General Index)
IFRSs International Financial Reporting Standards
IIP International investment position
INCIBE-
CERT
Instituto Nacional de Ciberseguridad - Centro de Respuesta 
(National Institute of Cybersecurity Response Centre)
INE Instituto Nacional de Estadística (National Statistics Institute)
INVERCO Asociación de Instituciones de Inversión Colectiva  
y Fondos de Pensiones (Spanish Association of Investment  
and Pension Funds)
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IRB Internal-Ratings Based approach
IRPH Índice de referencia de préstamos hipotecarios (mortgage  
loan reference index)
IRS Interest rate swap
JPY Japanese yen
LCR Liquidity coverage ratio
LSI Less significant institutions
LSTI Loan service to income
LTI Loan to income
LTP Loan to price
LTV Loan-to-value ratio (amount lent divided by the appraised  
value of the real estate used as collateral)
m Million
MREL Minimum Requirement for own funds and Eligible Liabilities
NDER Narrowly defined effective rate
NFCs Non-financial corporations
NGFS Network for Greening the Financial System
NISD Directive on security of network and information systems
NPISHs Non-profit institutions serving households
NPLs Non-performing loans
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OMFIs Other monetary financial institutions
OIS Overnight indexed swap
OLS Ordinary least squares
OLSIs Other less significant institutions
ONS Office for National Statistics (United Kingdom)
P2G Pillar 2 guidance
P2R Pillar 2 requirement
PEMEX Petróleos Mexicanos (Mexican Petroleum)
PER Price Earnings Ratio
pp Percentage points
PSD2 Payment Services Directive
P/B Price to book value
Q Quarter
QIS Quantitative impact study
ROA Return on assets
ROE Return on equity
RWAs Risk-weighted assets
SA Standardised approach
SI Significant institutions
SLIs Specialised lending institutions
SRI Systemic risk indicator 
SSM Single Supervisory Mechanism
TA Total assets
TARP Troubled Asset Relief Program
TLTROs Targeted Longer-term Refinancing Operations
T2 TARGET2
T2S TARGET2-Securities
USD United States dollar
WG-RFR Working group on euro risk-free rates
€ Euro
ATA Average total assets
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
BIS Bank for International Settlements
BLS Bank Lending Survey 
bn Billion
bp Basis points
CBS Consolidated banking statistics
CCPs Central counterparties
CCyB Countercyclical capital buffer
CDO Collateralised debt obligation
CDS Credit default swap
CEBS Committee of European Banking Supervisors
CET1 Common Equity Tier 1 capital
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union
CLOs Collateralised loan obligations
CNMV Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (National Securities 
Market Commission)
CNPIC Centro Nacional de Protección de Infraestructuras Críticas  
(National Centre for the Protection of Critical Infrastructures)
CPMI Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures
COCOs Contingent convertibles
COE Cost of equity
CPB CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis
CRDIV Capital Requirements Directive
CRR Capital requirements regulation
CSDs Central securities depositories 
CVA Credit valuation adjustment
DFR Deposit facility rate
EBA European Banking Authority
ECB European Central Bank
ECM Error correction model
EDW European Data Warehouse
EMBI Emerging Markets Bond Index
EMCI Emerging Markets Currency Index
EMEs Emerging Markets 
EMMI European Money Market Institute
EEA European Economic Area
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
EONIA Euro overnight index average
EPA Encuesta de Población Activa (Spanish Labour Force Survey)
EPU Economic Policy Uncertainty Index
ESRB European Systemic Risk Board
EU European Union
€STR Euro short-term rate
FDI Foreign direct investment
FED US Federal Reserve
FL Fully loaded
FLESB Forward-Looking Exercise on Spanish Banks
FSB Financial Stability Board
FSMA Financial Services and Markets Authority (of Belgium)
FSR Financial Stability Report
GBP British pound sterling
GDP Gross domestic product
GDPR General Data Protection Regulation 
GFSG Green Finance Study Group
G-SIIs Global Systemically Important Institutions
ID Data obtained from individual financial statements
ICO Instituto Oficial de Crédito (Official Credit Institute)
AT Austria
BE Belgium
BG Bulgaria
BR Brazil
CH Switzerland
CL Chile
CN China
CY Cyprus
CZ Czech Republic
DE Germany
DK Denmark
EE Estonia
ES Spain
FI Finland
FR France
GB United Kingdom
GR Greece
HR Croatia
HU Hungary
IE Ireland
IT Italy
JP Japan
KY Cayman Islands
LT Lithuania
LU Luxembourg
LV Latvia
MT Malta
MX Mexico
NL Netherlands
NO Norway
PL Poland
PT Portugal
RO Romania
SE Sweden
SI Slovenia
SK Slovakia
TR Turkey
US United States
